CHAPTER 3. De celo et mundo
Questiones super libros De celo et mundo
(Repert. p. 93; MacClintock n° 11, p. 124; Schmugge, p. 130)
Inc. (prol.) Ptolemeus scribit in libro Centiloquii sic: mundanorum ad hoc et ad illud mutatio
[…] (text.) Consequenter circa istum librum primo potest queri de quibusdam communibus et postea de speciali, quia dicit Aristoteles […] et ideo prima questio sit utrum corpora celestia sint causa inferiorum generabilium et corruptibilium […].
Expl. Propter hoc lapis velocius ibi movetur, ideo non valet.
The commentary has been transmitted in three manuscripts[1] and eight early editions. The edition Venice 1552, which is at the basis of the following description, contains 38 questions for book I and 29 for book II, treated in the order of Aristotle’s text.
The date of the commentary is uncertain. Neither MacClintock nor Schmugge treats this topic. MacClintock does not even mention it in his “summary of the main facts of chronology” (pp. 115-116). In fact, this commentary seems to have retained the interest of few modern scholars. It is shortly mentioned in an article of Grant[2] and has been the subject of study by Andrea Vella[3], but there does not seem to be much more literature, apart from a recent article of Aurélien Robert, who mentions, among other texts, this commentary of Jandun in an interesting study on climate theory in relation to the diversity of human languages[4].
Before addressing the text, we have to note that the formal presentation in the printed edition used here does not reflect the one in the manuscripts nor in other early printed editions, like the one published by Bonetus Locatellus in 1501 (with the emendations made by Nicolettus Vernia). I used the 1552 edition mainly because it has been digitised, but it also gives an idea of how later editors presented the text. First, the questions are sometimes separated by portions of Aristotle’s text. This begins immediately after the “Summa prooemii”, also added by the editor:
De natura scientia fere plurima videtur circa corpora et magnitudines, et horum existentes passiones et motus (this short sentence is marked in the margin as “Text.c.1.”).
Other examples are found for instance between qu. 4 and 5, or between qu. 11 and 12:
Ex his quidem utique manifestum, quia nata est esse quedam substantia corporis alia praeter eas quae hic consistentias divinior et prior horum omnium (followed in the margin by “Tex.c.14.”).
Secondly, in the 1552 edition the determination of each question is preceded by a “Conclusio”, that is, a short summary of the answer. This is a format not usually found in the manuscripts. So we have to adjust our vision in order to read the text of the questions as usual. In the following transcription of passages of the commentary I have of course eliminated the conclusiones added by the Renaissance editor, but I will give an example below.
Prologue
Here too, the commentary starts with a prologue, but it is much shorter than the one preceding the commentary on the Physics:
Ptholomeus scribit in principio Centiloquii sic: Mundanorum ad hoc et ad illud mutatio ex virtute seu mutatione corporum celestium procedit, rerumque naturas rimari volentem oportet primo corpora celestia speculari. In hac propositione corpus celeste, cuius scientiam querimus, describitur duobus modis et scientia eius redditur commendabilis. Primo ex communi contemplatione et respectu causalitatis corporum celestium ad ea que sunt hic, et hoc tangitur cum dicitur “mundanorum ad hoc et ad illud mutatio ex virtute seu mutatione corporum celestium procedit”. Secundo commendatur ex prioritate speculationis corporum celestium; et hoc tangitur cum subditur “rerumque causas rimari volentem oportet primo corpora celestia speculari ».
Ratio primi est quia mundanorum ad hoc et ad illud etc. ab illis procedit a quibus totus mundus inferior gubernatur, quia gubernatio alicuius rei gubernate a gubernante procedit, sed totus mundus inferior gubernatur a corpore celesti, per Aristotelem in primo Meteorum, ubi dicit: Est igitur mundus iste inferior contiguus lationibus superioribus, ut omnis virtus eius inde gubernetur[5].
Preterea, mutatio sempiterna debet esse causa mutationis nove et generabilis, sed mutatio horum inferiorum est generabilis et nova, et mutatio celestis est eterna, ideo etc. Maior videtur nota, quia rationabilius est quod perpetuum secundum aliquem modum sit causa generabilium quam econverso, ut patet secundo De generatione[6], quia si debet esse ordo inter motum perpetuum et novum, tunc oportet quod unus sit causa alterius, aliter ordo esset inconnexus ; ergo magis perpetuum in motu est causa generabilis in motu quam econverso ; et minor patet. Unde notandum circa hoc quod motus celi secundum totum est perpetuus, sed secundum particulares revolutiones non, sed corrumpitur, ut hesterna revolutio et hodierna, et secundum istum modum corpus celeste est causa mutationis inferiorum.
Ratio secundi est quia, cum sint diversi modi causarum, ut patet secundo Physicorum[7] et septimo Metphysice[8], quia quedam est communis et quedam propria, et quedam in actu et quedam in potentia etc., tunc ordo doctrine est primo ex cognitione causarum communium et remotarum ad proprias, ut dicit Commentator primo Physicorum et resumit in secundo[9] ; unde dicit quod doctrina ordinatur in scientia a cognitione causarum remotarum ad causas minus remotas usquequo perveniatur ad proprias et magis propinquas ; sed corpora celesta sunt cause communes et remote respectu inferiorum, ideo etc. Circa quod sciendum quod duplices sunt cause remote : quedam abstracte omnino a materia et motu, ut substantie separate ; alie sunt cause remote quia sunt in materia sensibili et habent accidentia sensibilia, ut corpora celestia. Modo, propositio Com/(2rb)mentatoris non est intelligenda de causis remotis omnino abstractis, quia iste non cognoscuntur nisi per sensibilia, ut dicit Commentator octavo Metaphysice et duodecimo[10], sed est intelligenda propositio de causis remotis in materia et que habent motum, et ab illis est incipiendum in doctrina (ed. Venezia 1552 f. 2ra-rb).
The prologue starts with a quotation from Ptolemy’s Centiloquium and its explanation: the corporeal body is described and its science is made recommendable in two ways. First by general contemplation and the relation of the causality of corporal bodies to the things which are here; secondly it is recommended by the priority of the speculation of celestial bodies. This explanation is then discussed with two arguments for the first point and one for the second. The argumentation contains, of course, references to Aristotle and Averroes, but also some personal notanda by the author (“Unde notandum circa hoc”) and at the end a note explaining in which way the passage of Averroes just quoted (about the progress in learning of a science from remote causes to less remote causes) should be explained: “About this one should know that remote causes are twofold […]”, some completely abstracted from matter and movement, others existing in sensible matter and having sensible accidents, as the celestial bodies. Averroes is of course speaking about the second kind: “but this proposition has to be understood about remote causes imbedded in matter and having movement, and from them one has to start in learning”.
After this short pedagogical prologue, the sixteenth-century editor adds a “Textus”: « De natura scientia fere plurima videtur circa corpora et magnitudines, et horum existentes passiones et motus »[11].
The commentary
The index of questions in the edition Venice 1552 (called “Primus index Quaestionum et conclusionum, et Capitum, quae continentur in quaestionibus Joannis Ianduni super libros de Coelo et Mundo…) gives for each item the formulation of the question followed by a “Conclusio”, for instance question I, 30:
- 30 An sine generatione possit esse aliquid postquam non fuit.
Con. Quod incipit esse postquam non erat, non semper per transmutationem assequitur esse.
As we saw above, in the edition of the text itself, the questions are also divided into questio (formulation and arguments) and conclusio. Thus, the first question starts with the formulation of the question (“utrum corpora celestia sint causa inferiorum generabilium et corruptibilium”), three arguments for the negative answer and four arguments for the “oppositum”. Then, in the edition the text continues like this:
Conclusio
Omnium inferiorum celestia corpora causa sunt, exceptis humanis actibus; quorum cause necessarie non sunt.
Thus, the “conclusio”, in the editor’s additions, is a summary of the answer. After this, the text continues as it normally does, with the determination of the master:
Propter hoc est dicendum ad questionem, quod corpora coelestia sunt causa omnium inferiorum, exceptis actibus humanis, et hoc patet ex dictis auctoritatibus, et adhuc aliis auctoritatibus […].
John adds some authorities, and then a rational argumentation (“Ubi potest etiam probari rationibus …”); he also adds a notandum before proceeding to the refutation of the contrary arguments (“Per hoc ad rationes”).
Thus, we have the usual form of the disputed questions, except for the fact that a summary (conclusio) has been inserted by the editor, between the first part of the question and the determination. Although John sometimes uses the term conclusio in his questions (for example, in qu. I, 12 quoted below), the insertion of the short summaries is not his work. The organisation of questions in questio-conclusio form has become popular in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries[12], but it is not found in the manuscripts nor in other printed editions of John’s commentaries, like in the one printed in 1501, mentioned above. Thus, the addition of short summaries seems to be a particularity of the editor of this edition[13].
Several ‘authorities’ are quoted in the course of the discussion (apart from Aristotle): Ptolemy, Albertus Magnus, Averroes (“Commentator”), Alexander (of Aphrodisias); at the end, John mentions the “doctores”, probably referring to all the earlier quoted authorities:
Unde in uno conveniunt doctores, quod celum non necessitat intellectum et voluntatem, tamen inclinat aliqualiter et facit multas inclinationes in humano appetitu et aliquo modo prosequitur illas inclinationes, sed alii non prosequuntur, unde est libertas in his actibus humanis[14].
In other questions, the first part containing the arguments is very short (the oppositum being sometimes reduced to what Aristotle says, e.g. qu. I, 5: “Oppositum vult Philosophus in littera, quia dicit […]”; qu. I, 6 “Oppositum patet auctoritate Aristotelis […]”), whereas the answer is very long (e.g. qu. I, 2). Sometimes the discussion of the answer takes several columns, for instance in question I, 3 (“utrum totum universum sit subiectum in hoc libro”), where the determination starts (after the “conclusio” added by the editor: “Corpus mobile est subiectum huius scientiae, Coelum vero est principalitatis subiectum”) with the discussion of different opinions:
De ista questione fuit diversitas: aliqui dicunt, ut dicit Expositor, quod subiectum huius scientie dicitur esse celum ; et hoc probant, quia invenitur in titulo greco libri de celo, et dixerunt quod omnia que considerantur hic preter celum considerantur per accidens, et celum consideratur per se […].
So, John quotes several opinions (with their refutation) before giving his own determination (“Dicendum est ergo ad questionem”), in which he proceeds by distinctio, and the refutation of the contrary arguments given in the beginning. Among the authorities quoted here (Averroes, of course, who is quoted everywhere[15], and Avicenna’s Metaphysics), is the “Expositor”, probably to be identified as Robert Grosseteste[16].
The part containing the master’s determination may be still longer: for instance, in qu. I, 7, where it takes up five columns, thus resembling a short treatise. And very often John begins his answer with a distinction of the terms of the question (“possumus intelligere duo”, “potest intelligi dupliciter”, “Notandum quod […] sumitur duobus modis”, etc.). This is a current habit among the commentators of his time, especially the Italians, who often start with the expositio terminorum[17]. And within the determination there may be several smaller discussions; for instance, in qu. I, 12 (“utrum corpus celeste in sphera activorum et passivorum sit eiusdem nature cum his inferioribus”), which represents all these features, the determination starts like this:
Notandum quod unum et idem multipliciter dicitur, ut patet quinto Metaphisice[18], unum numero, unum specie, unum genere, et unum analogia.
Tunc dicenda sunt ad questionem, primo quod corpora celestia et ista inferiora non sunt eiusdem nature secundum numerum ; secundo dicendum quod etiam non sunt eiusdem nature secundum speciem ; tertio dicendum quod etiam non sunt eiusdem nature secundum unum genus univocum et logicum ; quarto dicendum quod sunt unum aliqualiter secundum analogiam […].
Prima primi ratio […] Ratio secundi est cum arguitur […] Et confirmatur quia […] Item, si sic […] Item […] Ratio tertii […] et consimilem rationem facit Commentator in secundo huius […] Ratio quarti: illa que dependent ab eodem fine sunt unum secundum analogiam, ut vult Commentator quarto Metaphisice, ubi dicit quod triplex est analogia […].
Et notandum circa hanc conclusionem quod celum non est in eodem genere univoco cum inferioribus, ut dictum est. Contra hoc arguitur sic: que sunt in eodem genere substantie sunt eiusdem generis, quia […] Item, que conveniunt in uno corpore sunt eiusdem generis, quia […].
Dicendum quod celum non convenit cum inferioribus in uno genere univoco […] Item, corruptibile et incorruptibile plus differunt quam genere ; sed dicunt quod differunt genere naturali, sed non differunt genere logico ; sed illud non invenitur in dictis Aristotelis nec Commentatoris, unde ridiculosum est dicere et fictitium; unde etiam dicunt quod intelligentia et inferiora conveniunt in genere, quia in uno apparenti etc.; non valet, quod malum est apparens, quia nihil apparet de substantia, quia est insensibilis ; unde illa sunt dicta voluntaria.
Here we have the outline of the elaborate determination, organised as a small treatise. It starts with the explication of the terms and enumerates the four points in which the answer is organised. All these four points are duly discussed with arguments and references to authorities. Follows a notandum and finally, a discussion with some anonymous colleagues who are treated without amenity (their argument is qualified as ridiculous and fictitious).
This last feature, the discussion with contemporary scholars, mostly not mentioned by name (except for the thirteenth-century Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Robert Grosseteste) and often harshly criticized for their opinions is a permanent feature of John’s commentaries (and of his disputed questions), as we will see later.
Let us take a look at one of the ‘ordinary’ questions, in which John quotes different opinions without expressing too much harsh criticism, Book I, qu. 15 (“Next, the question is raised whether the sky depends of something as of an agent and efficient cause properly”)[19]:
(f. 11 ra) Consequenter queritur utrum celum dependeat ab aliquo tanquam a causa agente et efficiente proprio.
Arguitur quod sic, quia si celum non dependeret ab aliquo tanquam ab efficiente et agente, sequeretur quod forma fieret per se ; sed hoc est impossibile, ut patet septimo Metaphisice[20], quia forma non fit nisi per accidens […] tunc motus celi fieret per se, quod est contra Aristotelem primo Physicorum[21], ubi dicit quod tantum compositum sit.
Oppositum arguitur : si celum dependeret ab aliquo tanquam a proprio efficiente, tunc celum esset generabile et corruptibile ; sed hoc est impossibile, ut patet primo huius, quia est ostensum quod celum est ingenerabile et incorruptibile ; consequentia probatur […] tunc generatur secundum quid, ut accidens.
After these preliminary arguments for the affirmative answer (« Yes, the influence depends of something as of an agent and efficient cause properly ») and the negative one (« The opposite is argued […] ») follows, as usual, the determination :
Sciendum est quod una est opinio, ut recitat Commentator 12 Metaphisice[22], quod unum agens causat omnia corpora, quia producit actiones entium omnium in uno instanti, et illud agens causat omnia immediate ; unde isti negabunt ignem et aquam etc. concurrere ad generationem, ut aquam humidam et ignem siccum, et illud agens facit immediate hominem et omnia entia non mediantibus aliis omnino, et omnes actiones entium ; unde non oportet ignem calescere nec aquam humectare ; unde etiam subdit Commentator quod si aliquis movet baculum manu non proiiciens, vel movens est causa manus, sed illa actio a primo agente est sine omni medio et hoc facit omnia ex nihilo, et natura nihil facit nec ens naturale habet aliquam actionem ; et hoc modo celum est factum et dependet ab hoc principio effective et de novo est factum. Sed Commentator contra istam opinionem invehitur in 12 Metaphisice in illo capitulo: “Sunt quidam qui dicunt etc.”[23], et dicit Commentator: si entia non haberent proprias operationes, nec quidditates proprias, sed hoc est impossibile ; consequentiam non probat, sed potest declarari, quia postquam illud agens, cuius essent omnes actiones entium immediate, tunc non essent proprie actiones aliis entibus, quia actio est illius propria a quo immediate procedit, et per consequens entia non haberent proprias quidditates, quia operationes non dignoscuntur nisi penes quidditates proprias. Et tunc subdit Commentator verba plus blasphemice : Ista opinio remota est a naturalibus, quia naturalibus principiis repugnat, et illi qui recitant illam non habent cerebrum habile ad bonum, sed ma/(11rb)gis ad malum[24].
So, here we have an opinion quoted by Averroes and a summary of the way in which the same Averroes attacked this opinion in the Metaphysics, adding even a remark qualified by John as ‘blasphemic’ (saying bad things about someone) and which is at least irreverent.
Then another opinion is mentioned :
Alia est opinio et dicunt isti quod sit secundum opinionem et intentionem Aristotelis et Commentatoris, quod celum dependet ab efficiente, ut a motore primo, et dicunt quod licet celum non sit generabile de novo, tamen dependet ab aliquo agente eterno ; et hoc probant rationibus et auctoritatibus.
Prima ratio est quia si celum non dependet ab aliquo efficiente, tunc non esset primum efficiens ; sed hoc est impossibile […].
(follow six more arguments, so there are seven arguments in total)
And authorities confirming this position are listed :
Auctoritates etiam sunt ad istam partem confirmandam, quia Aristoteles dicit primo huius[25], quod Deus et natura nihil faciunt frustra, […]
(in total seven ‘auctoritates’)
But then follow ‘definitions’ against this opinion:
Sed contra istam opinionem sunt diffinitiones.
Primo, celum non videtur dependere ab efficiente, quia dicit Commentator quarto huius[26]: res eterne non habent causas agentes; sed […].
(in total five ‘definitions’)
The refutation of the arguments for this opinion follows, as well as the refutation of the authorities in favour of this opinion:
Per hoc ad rationes prioris vie. Ad primam, si celum non dependet etc., negatur quia […] unde hoc deberent probare, quod celum sit effectum, sed hoc non fecerunt.
(refutation of the other arguments mentioned above)
Ad auctoritates dicendum. Propter omnes simul expediendas est considerare in celo motum et subiectum, scilicet celum ; modo, corpora celestia indigent virtute activa, que est finalis causa substantie celi, unde non solum ad motum celi dependet a primo, ut aliqui dicunt ; unde, quando dicitur quod movens etc., intelligit quod est causa motus et causa finalis substantie que conservat ipsum in esse, non quod velit quod sit causa efficiens distincta a fine, quia tunc contradiceret sibi, quia dicit quod de quatuor causis celum habet duas, formam et finem, ut dicit quarto Metaphisice[27] ; unde dicit quod in substantiis incorporalibus motus apud modernos, quod procedat a primo per motum etc. non est, sed ab efficiente procedunt secundum similitudinem, ut a causa conservante.
Finally, we find the refutation of the argument for the opposite position:
Ad rationem in oppositum, cum dicitur si etc., dicendum quod formam generari per se intelligitur dupliciter : uno modo seorsum et divisim exi(12ra)stens, et hoc est impossibile, quia non existit per se. Alio modo quod per se generetur, idest per sui naturam, in alio tamen, et hoc bene verum est, immo necessarium est, et hoc dicit Aristoteles in septimo Metaphisice, ideo etc.[28]
So, this question follows the habitual structure: the arguments for the affirmative and negative answers (the celum has a proper efficient cause, or not) are followed by the determination in which John states that there are two different opinions about this question. He first presents an opinion mentioned by Averroes in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics, saying that “one agent causes all bodies” and that agent causes all things immediately. John explains: “and in this way the celum has been made by and depends effectively on this principle and has been made de novo”. But then, in another chapter of the same book, Averroes attacks this opinion in an argumentation about the proper quiddities of beings and adds “more blasphemous words”, says John, namely that “this opinion is remote from natural things, because it goes against natural principles, and those who repeat this opinion don’t have a brain prone to the good, but more to the bad”.
Then John mentions another opinion: their defendants (isti) “say that it is in accord with the opinion and intention of Aristotle and his Commentator that the celum depends on an efficient (cause), as on a first motor, and they say that although the celum is not generable de novo, it still depends on some eternal agent. And they prove this with arguments and authorities”. He then lists a series of six arguments and seven ‘authorities’.
After this, he gives a number of ‘definitions’ which go against this opinion, five in all, based on Aristotle and Averroes, and subsequently refutes the arguments that had been given “for the earlier (prior) way” (earlier mentioned), that is to say for the alia opinio. In the refutation of the third, he says, characteristically, that “to argument against is not to resolve”. As for the ‘authorities’, in order to evacuate all at the same time, he says we have to consider in the celum its movement and its subject. And lastly, he answers the argument for the opposite position, given in the beginning.
Thus, John extensively discusses the alia opinio, which says that the celum depends on “some eternal agent”. The celum depends on someone (or something) as on a proper agent and efficient cause, but it has not been created ex nihilo, which is, of course, in accordance with the natural philosophy of both Aristotle and Averroes.
Conclusion
The passages we have seen show that this commentary is a good example of a thorough, systematic commentary. John takes his time to discuss the various difficulties occurring for each subject and to refute the arguments and opinions of previous scholars with whom he disagrees. Without suggesting a chronological order, we may assume that John, dutifully and conscientiously, composed this commentary while teaching the subject in his arts course, but that he did not consider it as one of the most important books of Aristotle[29].
A comparison with the commentary of John Buridan shows not only the expected difference in style and expression, but also the gap between an early fourteenth-century approach and the resolute new attitude of Buridan’s time. As Moody expresses it, Buridan’s questions “stand somewhere near the mid-point of the shift from the metaphysical interests of the earlier medieval period, to the mechanical viewpoint of the modern era. Most of the subjects considered, and most of the problems discussed, go back to Averroes. But the estimates of the value of the arguments, the reliance placed on empirical evidence, and the constant preference for mechanical rather than metaphysical explanations of the dynamic order of the universe, reveal the profound difference between the intellectual atmosphere of the mid fourteenth century, and that of the thirteenth”[30]. Maybe we could say that John of Jandun’s approach, still indebted to metaphysical views, but also based on well-developed and valuable arguments, stands somewhere in the middle between the thirteenth-century world view and Buridan’s closer position to the mechanical world picture of later centuries.
[1] For the manuscript tradition, see Andrea Vella, “La tradizione testuale delle Quaestiones super librum de Caelo di Giovanni di Jandun”, in C. Martello, C. Militello, A. Vella (eds.), Cosmogonie e cosmologie nel medioevo. Atti del convegno della Società italiana per lo studio del pensiero medievale (S.I.S.P.M.), Louvain-la Neuve 2008, pp. 487-493. One of the manuscripts (Erfurt F.186) seems to be the reportatio of lectures in Paris. Vella rightly mentions the fact that various works of Jandun existed in different recensions, as is the case of this commentary.
[2] E. Grant, « Medieval and Renaissance Scholastic Conceptions of the Influence of the Celestial Region on the Terrestrial », in Journal of Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 17 (1987) p. 14. See also his Planets, Stars and Orbs. The Medieval Cosmos, 1200-1687, Cambridge 1994, p. 590.
[3] A. Vella, Voluntas aeterna : causalità e infinito nelle Quaestiones in Aristotelis de caelo, Bonanno, Acireale (BC) 2013.
[4] A. Robert, « The Diversity of Human Languages and Climate Theory. Philosophy and Medicine in Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato », in Micrologus XXXI* Special Issue (2023), pp. 153-190 ; on p. 167 he quotes part of the determination of qu. 1 (« Utrum corpora celestia sint causa inferiorum generabilium et corruptibilum »). See also Chapter 1.
[5] Arist., Meteor. I, 2, 339a. The formulation goes clearly back to the Auctoritates Aristotelis (p. 171.25, § 2) : “Totus mundus sensibilis contiguus est lationibus superioribus caeli sensibilis ut inde tota ejus virtus gubernetur”.
[6] Arist., De generatione 2, 11, 338a (in Moerbeke’s translation: Hec quidem utique rationabiliter, quoniam perpetuus et aliter apparuit in circuitu motus et qui celi, quoniam hec ex necessitate generantur et erunt, quicumque huius motus et quicumque propter hunc).
[7] This seems to be a summary of Arist., Phys. II.
[8] Likewise for Arist., Metaph. VII.
[9] Averroes, Phys. I, 1, f. 6E (JuntSecunda 1508) “Et innuit per hoc (sc. Aristoteles) quod dixit quod doctrina est ordinata incipere a cognitione causarum primarum rei cognoscendae perfecte, deinde intendere ad cognitionem causarum remotarum secundum ordinem donec perveniamus ad causas propinquas; Averroes, Phys., II, comm. 54, f. 69M.
[10] Averroes, Metaph. VIII, comm. 12, f. 220 (this is a summary of Averroes’ position); XII, summa 1, comm. 14, f. 301B-D (again a summary of Averroes’ doctrine).
[11] About this kind of additions, see above.
[12] Weijers, 2011, p. 181.
[13] One should of course check the other early editions in order to see if this is shared by other editors.
[14] In the transcription of the text of John himself I follow the normal medieval orthography.
[15] In the 1552 edition, the pertinent passages of Aristotle and Averroes are noted in the margin, respectively as “Text.” or “Tex”, and “Commen.”.
[16] Robert Grosseteste treats this subject in several works, particularly the early treatise De sphera, relying on Aristotle’s De celo et mundo, which he translated from the Greek; cf. S. Harrison Thomson, The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253, Cambridge 2013, p. 66. See C. Panti, Moti, virtù e motori celesti nelle cosmologia di Roberto Grossatesta : Studi ed edizione dei trattati “De sphera, De cometis, De motu supercelestium », Firenze 2001. In his more mature writings he often denounced the doctrine of the eternity of the world; cf. J. McEvoy, Robert Grosseteste, Oxford 2000, pp. 78-79.
[17] Weijers 2013, 143.
[18] Arist., Metaph., V, 10, 1018a.
[19] The question is mentioned by A. Maurer, « John of Jandun and the Divine Causality », in Mediaeval Studies 17 (1955) p. 186 n. 10.
[20] Arist., Metaph. VII, 1034a (Moerbeke’s translation : « Palam vero ex dictis quia modo quodam omnia fiunt ex univoco, quemadmodum naturalia, aut ex parte equivoca (ut domus ex domo, aut intellectu; ars enim species est), aut ex parte aut habente aliquam partem, – nisi secundum accidens fiat; causa namque faciendi primum est secundum se pars. »).
[21] Arist., Phys. I, 1, 193a32-193b6 (the tantum compositum seems to point to the hylomorphic nature of the heaven (celum) as a compound substance qua natural (incorruptible) substance (I owe this remark to Michele Meroni).
[22] Averroes, Metaph. XII, summa 2, comm. 30, f. 315G (refers to an unspecified sect of Platonists: “qui dicunt quod omnia insimul fuerunt”).
[23] Recte Averroes, Metaph. IX, cap. 4, comm. 7, fols. 229-232 (see the incipit of the chapter : « Sunt autem quidam, ut Megarici, qui dicunt […]».
[24] Cf. Averroes, Metaph., IX, cap. 4, comm. 7, f. 231 H-I [Digressio contra loquentes in sua lege. Si entia non habuerint actiones proprias etc.]: «Et ista opinio est valde extranea a natura hominis, et qui recipiunt huiusmodi, non habent cerebrum habilitatum naturaliter ad bonum»).
[25] Arist., De caelo et mundo, I, 4, 271a.
[26] Averroes, De caelo et mundo, IV, 1, f. 234A (« res enim eterne non habent agens »).
[27] Arist., Metaph. IV ?, non inveni.
[28] For a fuller transcription see Appendix 1.
[29] The related independent question Utrum omne generabile de necessitate generabitur, is in fact a more elaborate version of a question of this commentary (qu. II, 34).
[30] E.A. Moody, introduction to his edition of Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo, The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge (Mass.) 1942, p. xviii.
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