CHAPTER 2. Physica
Questiones super libros Physicorum (ca. 1313-1315)
(Repert. p. 93; MacClintock, pp. 122-123; Schmugge, pp. 126-127; 129)
Inc. (prol.) Sicut vita sine tristitia est eligibilis, ita ratio sensata amabilis. Istam propositionem scribit Aristoteles […] (text.) Circa istam primam partem philosophie naturalis que traditur in 9libro Physicorum primo potest queri utrum de rebus naturalibus possit esse scientia […]
Expl. ut mala sunt per se et directe, quia ipsum est totaliter optimum eorum que in natura. Cui sit honor, laus, virtus, potestas et victoria per infinita et eterna secula seculorum. Amen.
Editions used: Venice 1488, 1551.
The commentary has been transmitted in about eight manuscripts[1] and twelve printed editions, which shows its relative success and the lasting interest it provoked.
About the manuscript tradition and the variation in the number of questions, see MacClintock and Schmugge, quoted above. However, these scholars did not consider the possibility that the commentary may have been composed in distinct chronological phases, as is the case for other commentaries, for instance those on the De anima and the Metaphysics[2]. That this is clearly also the case here, has been showed by Roberto Lambertini and Andrea Tabarroni[3].
As for the date of composition, there has been some discussion, because two manuscripts seem to give the date of 1303; however, 1313 or 1315 seems more probable, as it is generally accepted that John’s scholarly activity took place from 1309 or 1310 onwards[4].
The commentary proceeds in the order of Aristotle’s work; the eight books are treated in a total of 148 questions. In the edition of 1488, Book I has 30 questions, book II has 16, Book III 13, Book IV 28, Book V 13, Book VI 16, Book VII 8, Book VIII 24. In the edition of 1551, where the questions have been doubled by conclusiones (see below), Book I contains 29 questions, Book II 15, Book III 13, Book IV 28, Book V 14, Book VI 16, Book VII 8, Book VIII 23, making a total of 148 questions.
The commentary has been studied for doctrinal aspects, like the natural motion of inanimate bodies[5] and the ontological status of time[6]. In this context, John’s commentary has been compared to the one by Thomas Wylton[7]. We will come back to this comparison later. First, I will focus on the method and style of the commentary.
I will start with a partial transcription of the prologue[8] before giving some examples of the questions themselves in order to gain an idea of the style and character of the questions composing the commentary.
Prologue (in the ed. Venice 1551, the ‘Praefatio’ is preceded by a ‘Summa praefationis’ and the three parts in which it is divided are also preceded by a short summary)
(ed. Venice 1488, p. 3a; ed. 1551 f. ixra) Sicut vita sine tristitia eligibilis, ita ratio sensata amabilis. Istam propositionem scribit Aristoteles in quadam epistola ad Alexandrum[9], que sic incipit: Aristoteles Alexandro bene agree. Et in ista propositione tanguntur tria quantum spectat ad propositum. Primum est vite sine tristitia condictio ; secundum est rationis sensate commendatio ; tertium est vite sine tristitia ad rationem sensatam assimilatio. Primum tangitur in prima parte propositionis cum dicitur vita sine tristitia eligibilis ; secundum tangitur in secunda parte cum dicitur ita: ratio sensata amabilis ; tertium vero tangitur in coniunctione sicut.
Primo ergo declarabitur primum, scilicet quod vita sine tristitia sit eligibilis ; secundo declarabitur secundum, scilicet quod ratio sensata est amabilis ; tertio tertium, scilicet assimilatio rationis sensate ad vitam sine tristitia […].
Primum sic ostenditur : omne bonum est eligibile et appetibile sine eo quod stupefacit et corrumpit naturam ; sed vita sine tristitia est bonum sine accidente quod stupefacit et corrumpit naturam habentis ipsum ; ergo vita sine tristitia est eligibilis […].
Nunc ostendo secundum, scilicet quod ratio sensata est amabilis ; quia illa ratio est amabilis que est certa quantum ad speculabilia et proficua quantum ad operabilia ; sed […].
Restat prosequi tertium, quod est ostendere similitudinem seu convenientiam inter rationem sensatam et vitam sine tristitia, que similitudo significatur in hac dictione sicut. Potest autem in eis assignari duplex similitudo quantum occurrit ad presens. Una est […].
Ex hiis ergo patet propositio assumpta quod sicut vita sine tristitia est eligibilis, ita ratio sensata amabilis ; ratio autem sensata, id est sensibilibus concordans, indubitanter haberi non potest sine notitia rerum sensibilium, quibus debet ratio concors esse, et de rebus sensibilibus quibus cognitio non habetur sine naturali philosophia, testante Aristotele in prohemio de anima[10], ubi dicit sic : « aut non est aliquis circa passiones materie non separabiles inquantum non separabiles, sed phisicus circa omnes quecunque sunt talis corporis et huiusmodi materie opera et passiones sunt ». Quasi dicat non est aliquis philosophus qui consideret passiones, id est sensibiles formas existentes in materia, nisi phisicus, id est naturalis ; naturalis autem est considerans circa omnes formas sensibiles et opera ipsius materie ; ergo manifestum est quod naturalis philosophia est necessaria ad rationem sensatam et ad eius amabilitatem perfectam.
The proposition “Sicut vita sine tristitia eligibilis, ita ratio sensata amabilis” (“just as a life without sadness is preferable, so reason based on sensible things is desirable”) is demonstrated in three points, each developed with the quotation of authorities and argumentation.
The following part of the prologue presents a division of natural philosophy :
(ed. 1488 f. 4vb ; 1551 f. ixva) Ipsa autem philosophia naturalis habet sex partes principales. Una quidem et prima considerat de ente mobili et de motu et de principiis eius et passionibus in communi ; et hec traditur in octavo libro (lege libris ?) Phisicorum.
Secunda pars est de ente mobili ad ubi, in qua considerantur corpora simplicia, scilicet corpora celestia et quattuor elementa sub ratione qua mobilia sunt secundum ubi et de quibusdam aliis annexis hinc considerandum ; et hec traditur in libro Celi et mundi.
Tertia pars est de ente mobili ad formam in communi, in qua consideratur de generatione et corruptione in communi et de augmento et alteratione ; et consideratur in eadem de primis generabilibus et corruptibilibus, scilicet de quattuor elementis sub ratione qua generabilia sunt corruptibilia. Et est notandum hic pro iunioribus quod motus ad formam dicitur omnis transmutatio que est acquisitio vel admissio forme substantialis, sicut est generatio et corruptio proprie dicta et omnis transmutatio qua communicatur aliqualiter generatio propria, sicut augmentatio […]
Quarta vero pars principalis scientie naturalis considerat de ente mobili in ordine ad quasdam passiones consequentes ipsum, primo secundum quod alteratum est ad qualitates primorum corporum, scilicet calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, et hec traditur in libro Methaurorum ; ibi enim consideratur de inflammationibus exalationum in sublimi, que consequuntur alterationem ad caliditatem et siccitatem et de ingrossationibus seu inspissationibus vaporum que consequuntur alterationem ad frigiditatem et de digestionibus et indigestionibus et multis aliis passionibus mixtorum que consequuntur alterationes corporum ad primas qualitates, sicut ostenditur ibidem.
Quinta pars principalis est de ente mobili mixto inanimato, scilicet de lapidibus et metallis, in qua considerantur principia istorum et accidentia per se. Sed illam partem non habemus ab Aristotele ; Albertus autem de hoc fecit tractatum satis bonum.
Sexta autem pars principalis est de corporibus animatis […].
This division of natural philosophy is in fact an enumeration of the various treatises of Aristotle. Among them he mentions the Meteora, a book which he did not comment on, as far as we know.
Follows the third and last part of the prologue, which is a long commendatio philosophie :
(ed. 188 f. 6a ; 1551 f. xrb) Munus philosophie est bene vivere. Ista propositio habetur a Seneca in quarto Epistolarum[11], epistola secunda, ubi sic dicit: Quis dubitare, mi Lucilli, potest deorum immortalium munus est quod vivimus philosophice, <id est> quod bene vivimus, <et> quasi dicit nullus ; vult igitur quod munus philosophie est bene vivere.
Potest autem ad presens hec propositio quatuor modis declarari. Primo ex parte suppreme perfectionis humane que est ipsius felicitas, secundo ex parte bone intellectionis, tertio ex parte optime instructionis, quarto ex parte recte actionis.
Prima ergo ratio sumetur ex parte humane felicitatis. Ad cuius evidentiam suppono tria: primum est quod felicem esse sive felicitas idem est quod bene vivere, et hoc habetur plane ab Aristotele in primo Ethicorum[12], ubi capit hec et supponit ex confessione omnium intelligentium quid nominis felicitatis ; et hoc dicit his verbis : bene vivere autem et bene operari idem existimant ei quod est esse felicem.
Secundo suppono quod operatio hominis nobilissima et perfectissima est eius felicitas ; et hoc potest probari sic […].
Tertio suppono quod nobilissima operatio hominis est munus philosophie, id est aliquod ab ipsa philosophia creatum ; et hoc probo sic […].
Ex hiis suppositionibus tribus sic sillogisatur : cuiuscunque donum seu munus est felicitas, eius munus est bene vivere ; sed donum philosophie est felicitas ; ergo etc. […].
Secunda ratio sumitur ex parte bone intellectionis. Et arguo sic : cuiuscumque munus est bene intelligere, eius munus erit bene vivere ; sed philosophie munus est bene intelligere, ergo etc. […]
Tertia ratio accipitur ex parte optime instructionis sic : illius munus est bene vivere quod oportuit mittere ad instruendum ignaros ; sed ipsam philosophiam oportuit mittere ad instruendum ignaros, quare etc. […].
Quarta ratio sumitur ex parte recte actionis sic : cuius donum est actio recta, eius donum seu munus est bene vivere, nam actio recta et bene vivere sunt idem, ut patet ex sexto Ethicorum[13] ; sed munus philosophie est actio recta […] constat autem quod iudicare certum et immutabile de quolibet et totius vite leges precipere est a philosophia, nam philosophia est universi cause cognitio, ut dicit Algazel[14] in tractatu De divisione philosophie ; et Robertus[15] in suo tractatu De ortu scientiarum dicit quod philosophia est humanarum divinarum<que> rerum [quod] cognitio cum studio bene vivendi coniuncta ; ergo actio, et per consequens vivere est a philosophia […].
Hec itaque ad commendationem philosophie ad presens sint congregata.
Thus, this long and elaborate prologue first discusses the idea, expressed in Pseudo-Aristotle’s letter to Alexander, that just as a life without sadness is preferable, so the ratio sensata, ‘reason’ in concordance with sensible things, is desirable, which leads to the conclusion that natural philosophy, which is at the basis of science, is necessary. The second part presents a very detailed division of natural philosophy, and the third part insists on the importance of philosophy in general. All these points are clarified and demonstrated with a richness of quotations (as one can see in the full transcription in the Appendix), of classical thinkers as well as of more recent philosophers, like Robert Kilwardby. In the section about the division of sciences, Albertus Magnus is credited with supplying a treatise on stones and metals. The various points are also logically argued, often in the form of syllogisms.
The fact that John judged his commentary on the Physics the right place to introduce his opinion on these fundamental topics, seems to indicate that he was at the beginning of his teaching career and also that he planned to follow, in his teaching, the usual order of the disciplines taught at the faculty of arts. This order is also the one in which Aristotle’s treatises are generally found in the manuscripts containing a corpus of these works and in the early editions.
Style and character of the commentary
Like almost all his other commentaries, John has composed his commentary on the Physics in the form of disputed questions, as was current practice in his time and the literary form of the questions is not deviating from custom. For example, the question whether motion is eternal[16], starts with seven arguments for the negative answer, and after the oppositum, consisting in the authorities of Aristotle and Averroes, the answer is, of course, affirmative:
Ad istam questionem dixit Aristotiles et Commentator quod motus est eternus. Ad cuius probationem […]
Sed dicit ulterius Commentator multum subtiliter quod mobile precedere motum secundum tempus contingit duobus modis […][17].
Follows an argumentation in which several possible objections are refuted. During this process, John defends Aristotle’s view, for instance in saying:
et ideo philosophi naturales et universaliter philosophi precedentes secundum humanum modum non viderunt talem productionem; unde, sicut Aristotiles dicit in primo huius[18], omnes qui de natura locuti fuerant, conveniunt in hoc quod ex nichilo nichil fit[19].
And the same is true for Averroes’s view. Both Aristotle and Averroes are firmly defended and arguments brought against them are often qualified as cavillationes or sophistical arguments (“Sed aliqui sophisticant hoc”; “Sed sophisticabis quod non est simile”).
Finally, John adds his caution (or ‘disclaimer’):
Est etiam considerandum quod, licet Aristotiles et Commentator sic dicerent motum semper fuisse et fore, ut ostensum est, tamen dico secundum fidem et veritatem, et hoc similiter determino, et indubitanter confiteor, quod motus incepit et terminabitur, et non solum motus habuit initium essendi, sed etiam omnia alia entia a primo principio, quod est deus, fuerunt facta postquam non erant, non quidem factione proprie dicta et univoca cum factionibus que nunc contingunt, scilicet per transmutationem et motum, sed factione omnino equivoce dicta sine motu et transmutatione et sine subiecto. […]
Istam autem conclusionem non probo ratione demonstrativa sicut nec alias quas fide tenemus et quas credendo meremur, nec puto quod sit possibile homini demonstrare eam ex principiis sensibilibus vel assumptis ex sensibilibus[20].
Thus, John is quite explicit in his profession of the difference between science and faith: he even adds that he ‘similarly determines’ this conclusion corresponding to faith, although one cannot demonstrate such conclusions by argumentation. It is clear that in this early period of his teaching career he could not take any risk of being accused of heresy.
The editors of the question consider that its philosophical content is disappointing (“John does nothing but cite the opinions of Aristotle and Averroes on each point that arises”) and that its most significant aspect is the ‘disclaimer’ at the end of the determination: Aristotle spoke only as a natural philosopher and we have to distinguish between philosophy and theology. We have discussed this issue in the Introduction[21].
The style of the question is rather personal (he addresses the readers) and sometimes one can detect the influence of the French language in which he expressed himself in daily life: “et tu cape sub hac minorem convenientem” (“et tu prends sous ceci la mineure qui convient”).
The rest of the commentary seems to proceed in much the same way. The formulation of the questions is followed by arguments for both possible answers (affirmative and negative), often the solution of the question starts with preliminary notes (“Ad questionis solutionem sunt preintelligenda aliqua”; “Ad solutionem est intelligendum”, etc.), but often also the answer follows directly (“Ad questionem est dicendum”, “Tunc dico ad questionem”). The discussion of the solution often comprises objections (“Sed contra istam positionem insurgent dubitationes multe”, “Dubitaret adhuc aliquis”, etc.).
In the printed edition of 1551 passages of Aristotle’s text are inserted, and also so-called Conclusiones, summarizing the solution. Although in the text of the questions John uses the term conclusio, the systematic insertion of conclusiones between the first part of the question and the second part, presenting the solution, certainly is the work of the Renaissance editor.
Let us take for example the fifth question of book I. It starts thus:
(ed. 1551 f. 5va) Consequenter queritur utrum universalia sint notiora quo ad nos ipsis universalibus.
Arguitur primo quod non quia […] Probo […]
Item secundo […] Item tertio […], (etc.) Item nono […]
Oppositum arguitur auctoritate Aristotilis et Commentatoris qui volunt […]
Here, the edition gives a general summary (conclusio) of the solution and afterwards John’s text continues thus:
(f. 5vb) Ad questionis solutionem sunt preintelligenda aliqua. Primum est intelligendum quod singulare […] dicitur dupliciter […] Ulterius est considerandum […]
His visis possumus dicere ad questionem tria. Primo […] Secundo […] Tertio […]
Sed contra istam positionem insurgent dubitationes multae. Prima est contra primam conclusionem […]
Alia dubitatio est contra secundam conclusionem […] ad primum possumus dicere […] Ad aliud […] Ad aliud […] Ad aliam dubitationem potest concedi consequens […] Aliter dicerent aliqui […]
Ad rationes principales dicendum est […]
Dubitaret adhuc aliquis contra tertiam conclusionem propter unum dictum Commentatoris […]
… dicente Themistio in Secundo de Anima […] Hanc autem auctoritatem et declarationem, quam posui, ideo hic ultimo induxi, quia mihi post consyderationem alterius auctoritatis occurrit, sed tu potes eam ponere tamquam dubitationem, et inde solvere modo predicto, quare etc.
Thus, John starts the solution with some remarks in order to make the terms of the discussion quite clear. Then he gives his answer in three points, to which he afterwards, discussing several doubts, refers as conclusiones. Finally, he refutes, as usual, the principal arguments against his position, but he still adds another doubt, prompted by “a saying” of Averroes (and concerning the way in which something is comprehensible by the intellect and by the senses) and at the end he adds the authority of Themistius in his commentary on the De anima, saying that if one prefers, one can consider it as a doubt.
It is clear that this text is the result of teaching Aristotle’s Physics in the classroom and that in preparing the written version of his lectures John was not too rigorous and allowed himself some freedom in adding afterthoughts, as shown by the last passage quoted.
Also, the following question (I, 6) is in fact not a question at all, but the discussion of someone else’s position, as a matter of fact that of John Duns Scotus, called here “a certain reverend doctor”:
Quidam reverendus doctor (i.e. Duns Scot) et subtilis multum posuit quod conceptus confusus speciei specialissime esset prius in intellectu quam conceptus universaliorum, ut […] Et hos probavit tribus rationibus […]
[Conclusio]
Et quamvis ille rationes pulchre sint et subtiles, tamen sententiam Aristotilis et communem doctrinam tenenti possible esset eam debilitare. Arguitur primo […]
John expresses his approbation of the “beautiful and subtle” arguments of this colleague, but then he shows how the followers of Aristotle and the common doctrine can attack his position.
The subject is the same as the theme of an independent question resulting from a disputation (the Questio de notioritate universalium, dating from 1314[22]). Possibly, this passage has been inserted in the written commentary in a later stage.
Discussion with colleagues
As in the question mentioned above (“Quidam reverendus doctor”), John’s commentary often contains implicit references to colleagues, with whom he disagrees on doctrinal interpretations. The case of Thomas Wylton has been examined by Cecilia Trifogli. The two masters disagreed on the doctrine of the ontological status of time as treated by Averroes: simplifying one can say that Wylton criticized the distinction between material and formal time, while John defended it. Thus, John reacts to one of the objections in Question IV, 27 saying that this is a misunderstanding rising from the ambiguity of the term subiectum; he firmly takes position for the above-mentioned distinction[23].
Another question of this commentary was the starting point of a discussion between John and one of his pupils, Maino de’ Maineri, “a philosophically active socius”, as Ermatinger[24] called him, of John of Jandun. Maino, a well-known Italian philosopher[25], criticized John’s position on the plurality of forms and John was clearly interested by this critique of one of his best students. He quotes him extensively in his treatise on the plurality of forms, preserved in the manuscript Reims 493 f. 151ra-166va, and dating from 1317 according to the colophon (thus, slightly later than this commentary on the Physics)[26].
The question of John of Jandun’s commentary on the Physics which provoked the discussion is the last question of Book VII (qu. 8)[27]. Maino’s criticism is found in one of the questions which follow, in the Florence manuscript, the commentary on the De substantia orbis. This commentary was first considered as anonymous (as it is found in the Florence manuscript), but is now safely attributed to Maino de’ Maineri[28]. The question, most probably also by Maino, concerns the relation between genre and species[29]. In this question Maino discusses and criticises in detail John’s views on the same topic. Finally, in his treatise on the plurality of forms (as found in the ms. Reims 493) John devotes roughly the last third to the discussion of Maino’s criticism[30].
I will first give a partial transcription of John’s last question on Book VII, before following the discussion between Maino and Jandun.
John of Jandun’s question on Physics VII, 8
(Ed. 1488 f. 115va; ed. 1551 f. 94va[31]) Queritur circa istum capitulum utrum genus sit in una natura. Et quia difficultas huius questionis specialiter provenit ex identitate vel diversitate forme generis ad formam specie, ideo queram sub ista forma: utrum forma generis sit eadem essentialiter secundum suam substantiam cum forma speciei aut diversa, et precipue in generibus aut speciebus de predicamentum substantie. Verbi gratia utrum sortes per eandem formam substantialem sit homo et animal aut per aliam et aliam realiter et secundum se; similiter autem in aliis[32].
Videtur primo quod sit eadem quia si forma substantialis generis esset alia realiter a forma substantiali speciei, sequitur quod genus non predicatur essentialiter de specie predicatione dicente hoc est hoc; sed hoc est falsum secundum omnes. Dicimus enim homo est animal et corpus et substantia, et probatur consequentia quia pars essentialis non predicatur de suo toto predicatione dicente hoc est hoc. Unde et Commentator dicit in septimo Metaphysice[33] quod dicere quod animal est anima est falsum et ipsum animatum est verum; modo si forma generis est diversa a forma speciei, tunc genus erit pars speciei, cum ipsum pertineat ad substantiam et essentiam speciei, et non erit tota eius essentia, ergo etc.
Oppositum arguitur: ille forme sunt diverse quarum una est realiter prior alia. Idem enim non est realiter prius se ipso, ut manifestum est, sed forma generis est prius realiter forma specie. Nam dicit Aristoteles in De generatione animalium[34] quod embrio prius vivit vita plante quam vita animalis, et vita animalis prius quam vita hominis; ergo cum non vivat nisi habeat animam, prius habet animam vegetativam quam sensitivam et sensitivam prius quam intellectivam.
After these preliminary arguments, two for the affirmative answer: the forma generis is essentially the same as the forma speciei as for its substance, and one for the negative answer, which will finally be adopted and proved, John details the procedure in which he will treat the question:
De ista questione fuerunt et sunt opiniones multum diverse. Sed ad presens propter brevitatem sic procedam: primo probando illam partem que est mihi probabilior; secundo congregabo difficultates que sunt contra illam, quarum quedam sunt demonstrationes aliorum; tertio solvam istas difficultates secundum posse meum.
He first proves the position which he esteems the more probable, with arguments and the quotation of authorities:
Primo quidem probo rationibus et auctoritatibus quod forma generis est diversa realiter et
secundum se a forma speciei et econverso, ut forma animalis a forma hominis et forma corporis a forma animalis et sic de similibus.
Pro prima ratione suppono tria. Primum est: omne quod inest homini per formam qua est anima, inest homini secundum quod est animal […]
Secundo suppono quod omne quod inest homini secundum quod animal, inest omni animali […]
Tertio accipio quod si esset eadem forma substantialis que dat esse hominem et esse animal, hoc non potest esse secundum diversos modos, sed oportet quod hoc sit secundum eundem modum vel non secundum alium et alium modum […] Si diceretur quod sunt substantie aut materia aut compositum aut forme, non est dicendum quod sint materie […] Ridiculum enim esset dicere quod eadem forma daret esse hominem et esse animal ra/(116ra)tione diversorum compositorum formaliter. Si vero dicitur quod illi modi sunt forme substantiales diverse, tunc […] Si quis autem diceret quod illi modi sunt quedam accidentia, hoc est inconveniens quia […] Et si quis cavillaret quod […] istud non sufficit intellectui quia esse hominem et esse animal est unum esse substantiale et indivisum realiter, ut dicunt isti, et ideo quicquid est dispositio ad unum et ad alterum […] Unde non est aliqua ratio quare illa forma daret esse hominem secundum unum istorum modorum et non secundum alium. Et cavillabis quod […] Hoc iterum nihil est quia […] Remanet ergo illa propositio vera, scilicet quod si eadem est forma substantialis que dat esse hominem et que dat esse animal, hoc non est per diversos modos, quia si quis hoc fingeret et queratur de illis modis […]
Hiis suppositis, si quis asserat eandem esse formam substantialem qua homo est homo et qua animal est animal, arguam ei sic : omne quod inest homini per formam qua est animal inest homini secundum quod animal per primam suppositionem et per consequens inest homini animal per secundam. Sed omne quod inest homini per formam qua est homo inest ei per formam qua est animal per suppositionem adversarii, qui concedit quod eadem est forma per quam aliquid est homo et animal ; ergo omne quod inest homini per formam qua est homo, inest homini secundum quod animal et per consequens omni animali. Tunc sumo istam conclusionem : omne quod inest homini per formam qua est homo inest omni animali, sed risibile inest homini per formam qua est homo, cum insit ei primo, ergo risibile inest omni animali, et sic inest asino, quod est impossibile ; ergo aliquod premissorum et non aliud nisi illud quod concedit adversarius, scilicet quod eadem est forma qua dat esse hominem et esse animal, ergo illud est impossibile, ex quo sequitur impossibile, ut patet ex primo Priorum. Sed cavillabit quis dicendo ad maiorem illud quod inest homini per formam / (116rb) qua est animal inest homini secundum quod est animal. Verum est si […] Et ad minorem cum dicitur quod […] Verum est sed non illo modo quo homo per formam est animal, sed alio modo […] Contra hec est tertia suppositio, quia […] ; unde non est ad propositum ibi reduplicare ut per illam est animal vel ut per illam est homo, quia ista non sunt diversa, ut patet diligenter consideranti.
Et hec est prima ratio, quam siquis vult solvere, rogo ut dicat ad propositiones et ad formam rationis, ne evasio apparens putetur esse vera solutio.
Item aliam rationem adiungo, cuius fere virtus est eadem cum priori. Illud cui aliquod accidens reale inest tali modo reali quo modo non inest forme hominis proprie nec forme asini et sic de ceteris formis specierum nec omnibus simul, illud dico est realiter diversum ab omnibus istis propriis formis. Hanc recipio pro manifesta ; si enim […]. Ergo forma animalis est diversa a formis propriis suarum specierum. Et idem intelligo de quolibet genere et speciebus eius per se et propriis. Sed aliquis cavillaret […] Hoc est frivolum, quia […] Preterea, si perseitas et primeitas quibus accidens reale dicitur [1…] sicut concludit Commentator de tempore quarto Physicorum. Hoc autem est absurdum. Preterea, … quod est ridiculum. Si dicas […] et est derisio in hoc dicendo. Item ad hoc ut aliquid accidens insit subiecto primo sufficit quod […] ut patet per Linconiensem[35] in primo Posteriorum […] Modo circumscripto omni opera nostri intellectus ad hoc subiectum aliquod habere in se causam precisam seu propriam sui propria intellectus accidentis, ut manifestum est; ergo etc. Et hec sit secunda ratio.
Item arguo ratione antiqua. Iste forme non sunt eadem forma essentialiter quarum una remanet altera corrupta. Hoc est evidens […] Si quis autem dicat quod […] Et aliqui respondent quod […] sed hoc est derisorium quia […] et hoc est contra Aristotelem et Commentatorem in primo Physicorum et in secundo. Aliqui vero respondent quod […] Sed hoc non potest sufficere […] Preterea […] Item […] Queritur hic pro solatio […].
Item adduco unam rationem quam tangit Albertus super quartum Methaurorum[36], cuius solutionem non perficit ad plenum … Quod si hec ratio est demonstrativa, bonum est; si non, peto quod eius solutio manifestetur secundum intentionem Aristotelis. Hec sit quarta ratio principalis.
Thus, in this first part of his working programme, in which he wants to prove the position he esteems to be the most probable, he lists four arguments. For the first, he starts with three ‘suppositions’ and then (“Hiis suppositis”) he answers to a possible adversary (“si quis asserat”, “nisi illud quod concedit adversarius”) arguing that it is the same substantial form by which man is man and animal is animal. In this passage he uses several times the term cavillare, which we may translate as ‘hair splitting’. And he ends his argument saying that if someone wants to ‘solve’ (or refute) it, he asks that this person answers to the propositions and the form of the argument, so that an apparent ‘evasion’ will not be considered as the true solution.
In the second argument, John also uses terms as cavillare, ridiculus, absurdum, derisio, but he ends with a simple “And this must be the second argument”. He adds an ‘ancient’ argument and treats it in the same way, adding the term derisorium to his vocabulary. Finally, he quotes a fourth argument touched upon by Albertus Magnus, but not ‘fully finished’. If this argument is conclusive, John says, then it is good, but if not “I ask that its solution (i.e. refutation) will be made clear according to the intention of Aristotle. And this must be the fourth principle argument”.
Follow a series of authoritative passages for his position, first of Aristotle, then of Averroes:
Tunc adducam auctoritates pro ista parte. Prima auctoritas est Aristoteles in secundo Metaphisice capitulo de statu in predicamentis, ubi ipse volens ostendere quod […] Et in hoc manifeste dat intelligere quod multitudo predicatorum in quid essentialiter ordinatorum est secundum multitudinem formarum. Item Aristoteles in septimo Metaphisice capitulo primo, nunc autem in quantum in analeticis de diffinitione ostendit quod […] Et hoc est quod dicit Commentator ibidem. Et intendit per hoc […] Si quis autem dicat ut quidam fingunt quod Aristoteles loquitur ibi de diffinitione […] hoc non est verum : primo hoc contra Commentatorem in principio capituli ubi dicit […] Item Aristoteles ibi loquitur de diffinitione pro conceptu […] Item Aristoteles loquens de genere quod est pars illius diffinitionis dicit […] Preterea Aristoteles loquitur ibi de illis partibus diffinitionis que […] Vult ergo Aristoteles quod […] Sed aliqui sophisticant quod Aristoteles accipit ibi genus […] patet ergo intentionem fuisse Aristotelis quod genus habet aliam formam a forma speciei.
Auctoritates Averrois sunt satis multe : primo in primo Physicorum dicit quod […] Item ostensum est alibi […] Alia auctoritas Commentatoris est in erroribus Metaphisice[37], ubi dicit quod materia prima recipit formam universalem et post mediante forma universali recipit formas alias […] Item parum post hec verba dicit Commentator quod genus est unum in una forma media inter actum et potentiam […] Item Commentator in tertio Metaphisice dicit quod […] Item in quinto Metaphisice capitulo de substantia dicit Commentator quod […] Et huic coniungendum est quod dicit in quarto Celi et mundi […] quod est contra Commentatorem plane ; vult ergo Commentator […] Sed aliqui extorte et impertinenter exponunt verba Commentatoris […] Hoc sine dubio est contrarium verbis et scientie Commentatoris in multis locis ; in octavo Phisicorum decimo capitulo: moventium igitur et eorum que movent, dicit sic : […] Item parum post in eodem commento dicit Commentator sic […] Item evidentius patet in alio commento super illam partem […] Item in quinto Metaphisice capitulo de parte dicit sic: […]
Istis rationibus et auctoritatibus poterit aliquis subtractari (« se retirer »?) in ista positione. Nunc restat videre dubitationes contra predictam positio.
After this impressive enumeration of the authorities in favour of his opinion, in the discussion of which he does not refrain from his habitual polemical style (“extorte et impertinenter exponent”), John esteems that his arguments and the authorities quoted allow to rest in this position. Then he starts the second part of his programme, the refutation of the doubts and the authorities going against it:
Prima dubitatio potest esse si in uno individuo essent plures forme substantiales, tunc illud individuum non esset ens per se unum, quod est inconveniens. Et patet consequentia, quia […] Item, si sic, tunc […] Item, si esset alia forma substantialis […] Item, secundum illam positionem […] Item, anima videtur esse actus corporis etcetera, hoc autem non esset si […] Item, omnis forma unita materie […] Item, si forma qua homo est corpus […] / (117vb) Item, si forma generalis […]
Auctoritates sunt multe que videntur contradicere huic positioni. Prima: Aristoteles dicit in secundo Posteriorum quod […]
Sixteen passages of Aristotle and Averroes are quoted. In the following, John aims to methodically refute all the arguments against his position and to show that the authorities quoted are not incompatible with it. In order to do so he first poses some ‘fundamentals’:
Propter solutiones omnium istarum rationum et auctoritatum consideranda sunt aliqua fundamenta. Primo considerandum est quod ponentes istam positionem recte ipsam intelligentes non ponunt quod forma generalis sit talis forma per quam aliquid sine forma perfectiori possit esse ens actu simpliciter; forma enim qua aliquid animal non est talis forma per quam aliquid potest esse ens in actu simpliciter […] Et ideo dicitur communiter et accipitur in quarto Topicorum[38] quod nichil est in genere quod non sit in aliqua eius specie. Nunquam enim forma animalis esset in materia nisi sequatur alia forma perfectior dans esse specificum […] Et hoc pulchre signavit Linconiensis in primo Posteriorum capitulo de per se, ubi dicit quod genus est causa speciei sicut forma materialis vel sicut materia formalis […] Per hoc solvitur quedam oppositio que posset hic fieri : cum enim forma animalis unde animal sit forma perfectior et nobilior quam forma propria cuiuscunque elementi aut aer aut huiusmodi et tamen forma […] Dicendum quod non est verum quod […].
Ulterius est attendendum quod multum refert aliquid uniri enti quod est in potentia et uniri enti quod est in potentia secundum quod est in potentia, nam […] ut vult Commentator in secundo De anima […]. Similiter dico econverso ad propositum quod multum differt […].
Considerandum etiam ulterius quod secundum istam positionem talis est ordo et pluralitas formarum in uno individuo, nam sunt plures forme substantiales ordinate realiter secundum suas substantias diverse, ita quod una non est alia nullam autem contrarietatem habentes inter se […] verbi gratia in Sorte est una forma substantialis imperfectissima et potentialis […] Alia est forma […] Ulterius est alia forma […].
De hoc autem est alibi perscrutandum, scilicet in questione de principio individuationis[39]. Et forte inter formam qua Sortes est corpus et inter illam qua est animatum bene est media forma, scilicet qua est mixtum […].
Est autem ulterius considerandum quod sicut videtur velle Avicenna in quinto sue Metaphisice[40] capitulo de assignanda differentia inter genus et materiam, genus potest accipi multipliciter […] verbi gratia animal signat compositum ex forma specifica sub ratione sumpta ab anima sensitiva vel a sensu et non significat aliquam formam specificam sub propria ratione et ideo non dicitur significare ipsas species […] Et de genere primo modo dicto loquitur Linconiensis in primo Posteriorum capitulo de per se auctoritate preallegata quod illud genus vel est forma materialis speciei etc. De isto etiam intelligo quod ipse dicit ibidem […]
After these four fundamental considerations, John attempts to solve the doubts that have been expressed above (“His preintellectis tentandum est solvere dubitationes superius adductas”). Here, I will only quote some personal expressions: “Et iste sunt solutiones sufficientes, ut puto, licet multi non considerantes totam intentionem Commentatoris multum substententur («are supported ») super ista auctoritate”. “Et istis solutionibus gavisus est animus meus cum laude dei”.
Subsequently, he discusses the auctoritates in favor of the position: “Modo est dicendum ad auctoritates que videntur istam positionem reddere probabilem”. Here too, he rejoices in the solution of one his solutions: “et in hac solutione gaudebit gaudens animus meus cum laude dei”. Sometimes, he admits his difficulty to explain some of the authorities: “Ad aliam dico quod multum fuit mihi difficilis auctoritas illa quomodo lapis componitur ex forma simplici et materia prima; tamen potest sic exponi quod lapis potest considerari […]”; “hec enim non est intentio Commentatoris, sicut ostensum fuit prius et alias probabitur deo dante”.
One of the doubts concerns the diversity of the sensitive, cogitative and vegetative soul. I quote the passage in an abbreviated form:
Ad aliam concedo quod anima sensitiva, cogitativa et vegetativa sunt diverse anime secundum suas substantias et non solum secundum suas potentias seu virtutes […] Verum est tamen quod semper una istarum presupponit aliam, scilicet perfectior minus perfectam, ut sensitiva vegetativam etc. et hec est intentio Aristotelis in secundo De anima ; non enim dicit Aristoteles quod […] et quod hec sit intentio Aristotelis patet ibidem […] Et si vis referre ad animas dicendo quod […], hoc bene verum est […] Et hoc bene signavit Aristoteles in littera cum dixit […] Concedo igitur animam vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam tres esse substantias ordinatas, ita quod […] Et quod dicit Aristoteles in erroribus de anima[41]: habet pro impossibili quod plures sunt anime in uno animato, sine dubio verum est […] Dicebant enim quidam[42] quod anima est armonia, id est proportio commixtionis […] Alia enim est compositio / (120va) carnis et alia ossis, ideo sequebatur sic animas esse diversas, quod est impossibile. Nos vero non ponimus istas animas diversas sicut formas ultimas specialissimas nec loco et subiecto distinctas, sed […] Et ideo in nullo auctoritates Aristotelis sunt contra istam positionem si bene inspiciat.
Scio tamen quod dominus Albertus super tertium De anima[43] in sua ultima digressione multum indignanter loquitur contra istam positionem et substentatores eius in primo capitulo de anima[44] de erroribus in ultima digressione et dure reprehendit eos. Sed sine dubio rationes eius quibus convincetur putative huius positionis falsitate non videntur in totum substantiales et excellentes quod in eis debeat gloriari. Una enim de suis rationibus est […] Et huic respondeo breviter quod […] Secunda eius ratio est quod […] Sed […] verum est tamen quod […] Addit tamen ulterius quod […] Ad primum istorum dico quod […] Quod autem ipse dicit […] Preterea Commentator Averroes in primo Phisicorum dicit […] quare igitur dicemus […] Ulterius accipit quod […] videtur autem quod ipse loquitur de unione actuum secundorum […] Et tunc manifestum est cuilibet intelligenti quid est dicendum, quoniam […] Manifestum enim est […] Et si quis diceret […] Et concederet quod […] (ed. 1488 f. 120rb-120v).
So, he mentions the passage of Albertus Magnus’ commentary on the De anima in which Albert severely reprehends the followers of the forementioned position, but John is not impressed and even says sarcastically that the arguments by which Albert will ‘putatively’ be convinced of the falseness of this position, “do not seem that substantial and excellent that he must glorify himself in them”. And he engages in a veritable discussion with Albert, which would perhaps be worth to be studied in itself.
Then he closes the discussion saying that if some student or colleague has a different opinion, he must refute his opinion and position, but if nobody does so, that will be a sign that they have been convinced to find the truth by his argumentation, and that is what he wants:
Sed hic volo finem facere usquequo de nostris sociis aut contemporaneis qui sunt alterius opinionis solverint nostras opiniones et positionem predictam dignum ducant improbare. Quod si nullus eorum rationes illas aut positionem illam improbare voluerit, signum erit quod ex illis demonstrationibus convicti sunt acquiescere veritati, et hoc est quod volumus (ed. 1551 f. 105rb).
Finally, as a serious teacher, he adds the usual refutation of the argument in the beginning of the question for the contrary position. He proceeds by a distinction, which he says to be not usual and famous, but still conform to the truth, and he adds that “if someone does not accept this distinction, he must rightly remove it by rational argumentation and not with blasphemous words or derision, as some used to do who hold for fictitious all that is not usual for them, although they cannot infirm it with arguments”.
Ad rationem in principio questionis adductam dico breviter quod […] Hec autem distinctio licet non sit consueta et famosa, tamen credo quod nulli dignitati repugnat, immo consonat veritati […] Siquis vero non acceptet istam distinctionem, iustum est ut eam removeat ratione demonstrativa et non per verba blasfemie aut derisionis, sicut consueverunt aliqui qui reputant fictitia omnia illa que non sunt eis consueta, quamvis non possint ea rationibus debilitare.
This righteous remark about scholars who reject with blasphemy and derision all the things that they consider fictitious because they are not familiar with them, although they cannot weaken them with arguments, is the end of the question, closed by a colophon, which is probably due to the editor:
Expliciunt questiones Gandonis (sic) super septimum Phisicorum. Incipiunt questiones eiusdem super octavum Phisicorum Aristotelis.
Thus, in this final question of Book VII, John gives a circumstantial account of his opinion about the problem and a thoroughly argued exposition of his arguments, the possible and real opposition against them, the authoritative passages in favour of or against his position, the doubts that may be raised and their refutation.
He announces his way of proceeding immediately after the preliminary arguments and in the course of the discussion he regularly indicates the different parts. The structure is methodical, but he also regularly shows his irritation, using no ambiguous terms (ridiculum, absurdum, etc.) or his approval (pulchre) about certain arguments. Harsh criticism is rather usual, but the formulation of his approval sometimes seems original: “and here my mind rejoices because of this argumentation”. He apparently appreciates not only Averroes, but also Robert Grosseteste for his logic. His attacks against adversaries are usually anonymous, but at the end he explicitly criticises an argument of Albert the Great (“but doubtlessly his arguments […] are not that substantial and excellent that he must boast about them”), whom he mostly approves. The use of the term adversarius indicates that he means an ‘adversary’ from outside his classroom, and not the opponent. Who this adversary is may become clear in the following: Maino probably treated the subject before, provoking John’s rejection in his question on the Physics.
In the next stage, Maino comments the theory exposed here in an independent question intitled Questio de pluralitate formarum, which starts thus: “Nunc restat dicere de forma generis et speciei, utrum scilicet realiter differant aut non”[45].
In order to form an idea of this critique, one can read the answer of John of Jandun in his treatise conserved in the Reims manuscript[46], where he not only mentions his socius, but sometimes even quotes him extensively. John’s Questio de pluralitate formarum (Reims, BM 493 f. 151ra-166va) starts thus :
Ad honorem dei omnipotentis et ingenii domini mei, domini Ludovici de melunduno volo disputare hanc questionem, an in uno et eodem individuo forma generis sit alia realiter et substantialiter a forma speciei, verbi gratia utrum forma per quam Sortes est animal sit alia realiter et per se a forma per quam ipse est homo, et sic in aliis[47].
In the following I quote the part in which John directly reacts to Maino’s question, announcing that he has received a “quaternus” of one of his “socii”, a very subtle and intelligent man, he says, who has tried to solve his first argument, and that he wants to consecrate a special “capitulum” to this solution, in order to consider it more diligently:
(161vb) Omnibus hiis expeditis cum laude Dei, offerebatur mihi quaternus cuiusdam sociorum nostrorum / (162ra) magne subtilitatis et profundi ingenii in quo ipse laborabat ad solutionem nostre prime rationis; de qua solutione volo nunc facere capitulum speciale, ut diligentius consideretur. Et primo expediam me de quibusdam instantiis que ex verbis eius possunt accipi contra illam rationem. Secundo ponam solutiones principales et obiciam contra eas ex per se notis sicut potero.
After answering the instantie, John discusses one particular part of his opponent’s position:
(f. 163rb) Nunc accedo magis ad rationes istius viri ut melius habeatur eius intentio, ubi ponam <verba eius> (ms. non ergo). Dicit sic : est tamen intelligendum[48] propter solutionem prime rationis quod res absolute non redu<pli>cantur nec forma rei, sed sub aliqua ratione intelligendi ; et hoc est quod de se notum est, quia sicut res non offertur intellectui nisi sub aliqua ratione intelligendi, ita autem forma rei non reduplicatur nisi sub ratione aliqua intelligendi. Et ideo secundum diversitatem rationum intelligendi attenditur diversitas reduplicationum, ita quod aliquid potest / (163va) inesse rei sub aliqua reduplicatione rei sub una ratione intelligendi, quod non inest eidem sub reduplicatione eiusdem forme ; sub alia tamen ratione […].
Sometimes, John expresses his disagreement in a personal way, calling Maino his respondens, which probably means that Maino had acted as respondent in the discussion of his master’s question:
Sed revera ista responsio salva gratia respondentis multum est insufficiens et ei (lege ea) que ponebantur in diffinitione illius rationis evidenter tollit hec responsio. Unde multum miror quare diligentia istius viri non consideravit in illis nec respondit ad illa. Arguo igitur ad hoc […].
This goes on for nearly four columns and then, in another four columns, John gives an extensive quotation from Maino’s question, saying explicitly that he does not want to create the impression that he has left out part of his opponent’s intention:
(f. 164rb) Nunc pono aliam responsionem istius viri et ne propter abbreviationem videar aliquid omisisse de intentione eius, accipiam omnia eius verba sicut in libro suo. Dicit sic : Aliter potest dici ad illam rationem sustinendo quod eadem forma non realiter diversificata dat esse hominem et esse animal et esse corpus, et sic de aliis predicatis inquit. Et dico quod ista esse non sunt omnino diversa nec sunt omnino idem, sed sunt idem realiter, differentia secundum esse magis et minus perfectum. Unde pono quod forma eadem realiter dat esse hominem et esse animal et esse album et esse coloratum ; tamen dat ista esse quodam ordine, ita quod unum prius via generationis et aliud posterius via generationis; econverso tamen est via perfectionis ; et istud habet quelibet forma […].
Then, John summarizes this passage of Maino and criticises it:
(f. 166va) Recoligendo ergo breviter virtutem rationis : ad hoc ut aliquid insit homini secundum quod animal et per consequens omni animali aut requiritur [ut expung.] et sufficit quod insit ei per formam qua est animal sub ratione intelligendi seu conceptu intelligibili animalis ; et hoc est remotum perfecta remotione. Aut requiritur et sufficit quod insit ei per formam qua est animal sub illo gradu perfectibili quo dat esse animal, et hoc est reprobatum evidenter. Aut requiritur et sufficit quod insit ei per connotatum/ationem ? animalis, et hoc etiam remotum est aperte. Aut requiritur et sufficit quod insit ei per formam qua est animal non sine connotato ? animalis, et hoc est destructum. Aut requiritur et sufficit quod insit ei per animalitatem formaliter tamquam per aliquid aliud ab ipsa forma animalis, ut dicebant aliqui, et hoc est repulsum ? sufficienter. Aut requiritur et sufficit quod insit ei per formam qua est animal absolute, et tunc habetur propositum sine omni fuga et contradictione.
Finally, he concludes in the following way, qualifying, rather ungracefully, the whole discussion as cavillationes, but insisting on the ‘ancient truth’, which had been denied more because of the fame of the deniers than because of their arguments. And he adds a rather pompous remark about the necessity of explaining a truth which is hidden and ignored by many, by means of many explanations and examples, so that it will satisfy not only the advanced students but also the younger ones:
(166va) Omnibus igitur his cavillationibus exterminatis facile erit unicuique bene disposito non impedito consuetudine contraria removere universas evasiones queque potuerint dari ad illam rationem supra positam et defendere illam antiquam veritatem de pluralitate formarum generis et specie que aliquo tempore negata erat magis propter famositatem negantium eam quam propter efficaciam rationum. Nullus itaque studiosus et verus philosophice veritatis amicus in huius operis longitudine fatigetur, nam etsi veritas stet in paucis, ut consueverunt aliqui proverbialiter dicere, tamen cum aliqua veritas est occulta et a multis ignota, a pluribusque negata, indiget declarationibus et munimentis quam plurimis per que vere tum provectis sed et iunioribus satisfiat.
Laus et gloria sit Deo altissimo et vero doctori qui mentem illuminat et veritatem ostendit. Amen.
In the manuscript, the following colophon is added:
Explicit questio de pluralitate formarum et diversitate generis et speciei ordinata per magistrum Iohannem de Leuduno et completa anno domini 1310° 23. die ianuarii[49].
Thus, John more or less excuses himself for the length of his treatment, necessary to establish and elucidate an often ignored and sometimes denied truth. It is clear that this question is important for him.
Conclusion
We may conclude that this early commentary (at least in the redaction quoted here) reflects some of the basic characteristics of John of Jandun: his faithful following of Averroes, the personal style (including sometimes colloquial expressions), the discussion with colleagues having different opinions. One can imagine the young master at the beginning of his teaching career, relying on a solid education at the arts faculty and the authority of great predecessors, passionately discussing important doctrinal questions before his students.
To give an idea of his style, we may quote the way in which he ends a discussion[50]:
“But here I want to come to an end, until among our students or contemporaries who have a different opinion some have solved our opinions and say that they refute (improbare) the foresaid position. And if none of them wants to refute these opinions, that will be a sign that by these demonstrations they are convinced to consent to the truth, and that is what we want”.
And this passage in the explicit of the last question of book VII, quoted above, about those who consider fictitious all things that are not usual for them, although they are not able to weaken them with arguments”.
It has been said that John is talkative and garrulous; the passages quoted may confirm this opinion, but we should also consider the thoroughness of the way in which he discusses all possible arguments in favour of his position or contrary to it. And the way in which he expresses himself, apart from the sometimes colloquial twists, can certainly be called vivid and intelligent. He must have been a popular master.
[1] A new copy has been discovered by Aurora Panzica in the library of the Istituto Campana at Osimo, ms. 18.L.38 ; see A. Panzica, « Commenti ad Aristotele nella Biblioteca dell’stituto Campana a Osimo : Umberto di Preuilly, Rodolfo Brito, Giovanni di Jandun », in BPhM 63 (2021) pp. 243-270 (258-261).
[2] As pointed out by Lambertini and Tabarroni in their study p. 56, n. 27. See R. Lambertini & A. Tabarroni, “Le Quaestiones super Metaphysicam attribuite a Giovanni di Jandun. Osservazioni e problemi”, in Medioevo 10 (1984) pp. 41-104 ; Ermatinger already suggested there were two distinct ordinationes of the Questiones super Physicam (see Trifogli, op. cit. infra n. 6, p. 493).
[3] See n. 2.
[4] See especially MacClintock, pp. 110-113; Schmugge, pp. 126-127.
[5] E. Sylla, “Aristotelian Commentaries and Scientific Change: The Parisian Nominalists in the Cause of the Natural Motion of Inanimate Bodies”, in Vivarium 31 (1993), pp. 62-68, 82.
[6] C. Trifogli, « Il problema dello statuto ontologico del tempo nelle Questiones super Physicam di Thomas Wylton e di Giovanni di Jandun », in Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale I, 2 (1990) pp. 491-513; ead., “Averroes’ Doctrine of Time and Its Reception in the Scholastic Debate”, in P. Porro (ed.), The Medieval Concept of Time. The Scholastic Debate and Its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy, Leiden 2000, pp. 67-73.
[7] C. Trifogli, op. cit.
[8] For a more complete transcription of the prologue, together with the prologues of other commentaries (De celo, De anima, Rethorica, Metaphysica, Expositio De anima), see Appendix 1.
[9] Ps-Arist., Epistola ad Alexandrum, cap. 1, Bekker 1420b.
[10] Arist., De anima I, 1 (403b).
[11] Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium (LLA 335.PH), IV, 2, epist. 90, par. 1, p. 382: «Quis dubitare, mi Lucili, potest, quin deorum immortalium munus sit quod vivimus, philosophiae quod bene vivimus itaque tanto plus huic nos debere quam dis, quanto maius beneficium est bona vita quam vita, pro certo haberetur, nisi ipsam philosophiam di tribuissent».
[12] Arist., Ethica, I, 2, 1095a 16-20.
[13] Cf. Arist., Ethica, VI, 5, 1140a. General reference, possibly via Grosseteste, p. 257, 10: « Videtur autem prudentis esse posse bene consiliari circa ipsi bona et conferencia, non secundum partem, puta qualia ad sanitatem vel fortitudinem, set ad bene vivere totum».
[14] Algazel, Metaphysica, ed. Muckle, cap. 1 (De divisione scienciarum), p. 2, ll. 3-5, 4 l. 34. Perhaps the texts John had in mind are these: p. 4,34 « Incidit autem in hanc scienciam consideracio de causa universi esse» and p. 2, 3-5: « Alterum est quo cognoscuntur disposiciones omnium que sunt; ad hoc ut describatur in animabus nostris forma universi esse». He might have conflated these two passages while quoting by heart and has translated the realm of reference, as Algazel talks about metaphysics alone (scientia divina), from metaphysics to philosophy more in general.
[15] Robert Kilwardby, De ortu scientiarum, c. 2, p. 10, ll. 10-11, ed. Judy. The definition is from Isidore, Ethymologiarum II, 24, ed. Lindsay §1.
[16] Edited by R.C. Dales & O. Argerami, Medieval Latin Texts on the Eternity of the World, Leiden 1991, pp. 180-193. Follows logically question VIII, 5 “An motus eternus dependeat motore aliquo effective”. For this question, cf. Maurer, « John of Jandun and the Divine Causality », in Mediaeval Studies 17 (1955) pp. 185-207 (here p. 186 n. 10).
[17] Dales & Argerami, op. cit., pp. 183-184.
[18] Phys. I, 4.
[19] Op. cit., p. 185.
[20] Op. cit., pp. 192-193.
[21] See above, the Introduction.
[22] See Repert., p. 102.
[23] Cf. Trifogli, op. cit., pp. 495-504. See also Ead., “Averroes’s Doctrine of Time and its Reception in the Scholastic Debate”, in P. Porro (ed.) The Medieval Concept of Time, Leiden/Boston/Köln 2001, 57-82 (67-73).
[24] Cf. Ch. Ermatinger, « Maino de’ Maineri in His Still Unstudied Role as Philosopher, I. Early XIVth Century Paris”, in The Second Saint Louis Conference on Manuscript Studies, in Manuscripta 3 (1959) pp. 8-9. Ermatinger here dismisses an earlier attribution to Radulphus Brito. See also G. Fioravanti, “Il Principium di Maino de’ Maineri alla Quaestiones super De substantia orbis », in A. Rodolfi (ed.), « Ratio practica » e « ratio civilis ». Studi di etica e politica medievali per Gianfranco Garfagnini, Pisa (Edizioni ETS) 2016, pp. 207-223.
[25] Fioravanti, in his study on the principium of Maino’s questions on De substantia orbis, gives a short account of Maino’s life (see the article quoted in n. 24). Maino’s other works include a commentary on the third book of De anima et un Tractatus de intentionibus secundis.
[26] The Questio de pluralitate formarum, cf. Repert., p. 99.
[27] Ed. Venetiis 1488, f. 115va-121ra; ed. Venetiis 1551, f. 94va-99ra. Cf. Ermatinger, “Notes on Some Early Fourteenth Century Scholastic Philosophers”, in Manuscripta 3 (1959) pp. 155-164.
[28] Cf. Ermatinger, op. cit. n. 23. The ms. is Firenze, B.N.C. Conv. Soppr. J. 3. 6, where the commentary is found on f. 89va-96ra; the long question on the plurality of forms is on f. 105ra-108rb. For the attribution see Fioravanti, op. cit. (n. 8), pp. 208-209.
[29] On the relation between genre and species and on the influence of Jandun on the later tradition, see R. Saccenti, « Sul concetto di specie. Un dibattito bolognese del XIV secolo attraverso una quaestio di Matteo da Gubbio », in Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 33 (2022), pp. 249-288.
[30] Cf. J. Ermatinger, « John of Jandun in his Relations with Arts Masters and Theologians », in Arts libéraux et Philosophie au Moyen Age, éd. Ch. Wenin, Montréal/Paris 1969 pp. 1173-1184 (1174-1175).
[31] In the table of chapters et questions, the title of this questionis the following : « An genus sit in una natura, scilicet an generis forma eadem sit cum forma specifica secundum substantiam », and it is followed by two ‘conclusions’ : « Conclusio : Non est una secundum substantiam ac rationem generis ac speciei natura sive forma », « Conclusio : Quod non sint plures forme in composito tum rationibus, tum auctoritatibus Aristotelis et Averrois arguit ».
[32] In the edition 1555, the following passage is inserted here : « In antiquis codicibus sic legitur, hanc autem quaestionem quaeras inter sophismata, et sic ista quaestio solum hic annectitur gratia doctrinae ». About this addition « Hanc autem questionem queras inter sophismata », found in some editions and in the ms. Vat. Reg. 1342 f. 120rb, see MacClintock, p. 112.
[33] Cf. Averroes, Metaphysica, VII, cap. 5, f. 169L «animal est aliquid et essentia eius aliud est».
[34] Arist., De generatione animalium, II, 3, 753b : «vivunt autem primo et que in ovis facta et que in animalibus plante vitam».
[35] Id est Robertus Grosseteste, Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros (1225-1228).
[36] Albertus Magnus, Comm. In Metheor., Opera éd. Borgnet 1890 t. IV p. 477-832 ; Editio digitalis (Aschendorf Verlag), t. VI, 1.
[37] The expression « errores Metaphysice » probably refers to the first book, in which earlier opinions are discussed. Cf. Auctoritates Aristotelis (Metaphysica, book I, Commentator, § 31, p. 117, ll. 37-39) : «Materia prima nullam formam habet omnino nec universalem nec particularem sed recipit primo formam universalem et mediante illa recipit omnes alias formas usque ad individuales».
[38] Arist., Topica, IV, 1, 121a. Cf. Auctoritates Aristotelis: «Unde nihil est in genere quod non sit in aliqua suarum specierum » (§ 57, p. 326, ll. 71-73).0
[39] John here refers to his question De principio individuationis, cf. Repert. 5, p.102.
[40] Avicenna, Metaphysica, V, 3.
[41] Arist., De an. I : the expression « errores de anima » means the first book, in which Aristotle discusses the opinions of his predecessors.
[42] The quidam quoted here may be the Pithagorici (concerning De anima 407b27) and also directly Plato’s Timaeus, critised by Aristotle (De anima 406b30). Here the reference is obviously to Averroes (Commentarium Magnum), who follows Aristotle’s criticism (cf. ed. Crawford, pp. 75 sqq.). I thank Paola Bernardini for this comment.
[43] Albertus Magnus, De anima, ed. C. Stroick, Aschendorff, Münster 1968, lib. III, tract. 5, cap. 4, pp. 248-250: Et est digressio declarans, quod sensibile et vegetativum et rationale in homine sunt una simplex substantia.
[44] Maybe this refers to Albertus Magnus, De anima, lib. I, tract. 1, cap. 1, ed. C. Stroick, pp. 1-5 (Et est digressio declarans, quod scientia naturalis est de anima et quis ordo eius), because here (p. 2, ll. 18-35) the relation genus/species of man is discussed (and it ends thus : « esse tamen hominem inquantum homo est solum intellectum ». Here too, I thank Paola Bernardini for her remark.
[45] Ms. Firenze, BNC Conv. Soppr. J. 3. 6, f. 105ra-108rb.
[46] Also in ms. Escorial, lat. f.II.8 f. 52-78, and a short version in Vat. lat. 6768. Cf. Repert. V, p. 99.
[47] This question is waiting for an edition.
[48] For the following passage, see the commentary on the De substantia orbis, ms Firenze f. 106ra.
[49] Ermatinger, op. cit., pp. 1174-1175, quotes this passage, but, apart from some small omissions, reads: anno domini 1317° (so also the catalogue of the Reims manuscripts, and my Repertorium (V, p. 99), where I simply adopted the current opinion, probably based on Ermatinger’s reading). However, this does not seem conform to the ms., although the form of the last cipher is not very clear. So, we may assume that John wrote this question very early in his teaching career.
[50] See the end of his Questio de pluralitate formarum, quoted above.
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