The question on the topic of the fantasia, is longer and, it seems to me, more interesting than the one on the sensus communis, which I mentioned in Chapter 4. It follows here in extenso, but without identification of the sources. The transcription, based on the edition Venice 1483, is followed by a summary and partial translation.
Deinde queritur circa capitulum de fantasia, utrum fantasia sit idem cum sensu.
Arguitur primo quod sic, quia omnis virtus cognoscitiva organica videtur esse sensus ; in hoc enim differt sensus ab intellectu, ut patet in ista scientia ; sed fantasia est virtus cognoscitiva organica, ut manifestum est per Aristotelem in isto secundo et in tertio.
Item, iste virtutes sunt eedem que habent idem obiectum ; hec videtur manifesta, nam virtutes distinguuntur per actus et actus per obiecta, ut communiter dicitur ; sed fantasia habet (ms. 123vb) idem obiectum cum sensu, nam sicut visus potest videre colorem, sic fantasia potest ipsum fantasiari ; et similiter est de aliis sensibus ; quare etc.
Item, fantasia aut est sensus aut est motus factus a sensu secundum actum; hec videtur divisio sufficiens secundum Aristotelem, quia fantasia non potest esse scientia nec opinio nec intellectus nec compositum ex opinione et scientia, ut satis ostendit Aristoteles in littera ; unde sine dubio relinquitur ipsam esse vel sensum vel motum factum a sensu secundum actum ; sed non potest esse motus factus a sensu secundum actum ; probatio quia motus non remanet deficiente movente ; hec est manifesta per se et habetur ex tertio et septimo et octavo Physicorum ; modo deficiente sensu secundum actum adhuc remanet fantasia, ut patet in dormiente somniante ; in ipso enim non est aliquis sensus particularis in actu sentiendi, ut patet ex De sompno et vigilia ; et si in ipso est sensus communis in actu, ipse non movet fantasiam, sed magis movetur ab ymaginativa per speciem in ea reservatam, ut habet videri in De sompno et vigilia ; ergo etc.
Oppositum vult Aristoteles in littera.
(Solution)
Ad evidentiam questionis premittenda sunt aliqua. Primo quod virtutes anime sensitive secundum Albertum sunt diversorum generum; quedam sunt apprehensive de foris et iste dicuntur sensus particulares exteriores, scilicet visus, auditus etc. Et dicuntur exteriores non quia solum sint in extremitatibus corporis sed quia immuntantur a sensibilibus exterioribus non mediantibus aliis virtutibus anime prius immutatis, ut visus immutatur a colore sine aliquo sensu intermedio et auditus a sono et sic de ceteris. Et dicuntur particulares quia unusquisque eorum determinatus est ad aliquod genus sensibilium et aliud non cognoscit, ut visus ad colores et auditus ad sonos. Alie vero sunt virtutes apprehensive de intus et hec communiter vocantur sensus interiores, qui non immutantur a rebus exterioribus nisi mediantibus aliis sensibus ; et isti sunt quinque secundum Albertum, scilicet sensus communis, ymaginativa, cogitativa, fantasia et memorativa ; quarum necessitatem et distinctionem sic docet Albertus.
Ad cuius evidentiam premitto duo : primo quod in individuis substantiarum et precipue in hominibus non solum sunt accidentia sensibilia, propria et communia, sed etiam in eis sunt quedam proprietates quas non cognoscunt sensus particulares, sicut in Sorte est bonitas vel militia vel paternitas vel filiatio, et mansuetudo vel iracundia vel sanitas vel egritudo (46ra) et quando et ubi et huiusmodi forme quas nullus particularium sensus cognoscit ; et ideo dicuntur intentiones non sensate ; et hoc satis insinuat Commentator in suo libello De memoria et reminiscentia.
Ulterius premitto quod non est unius et eiusdem virtutis anime bene recipere species et bene retinere seu conservare ; cuius ratio est secundum Albertum et accipit a Commentatore in suo libro De memoria et reminiscentia, quia ad hoc quod virtus sit bene receptiva requiritur dominium humiditatis super siccum in complexione sui organi, humidi enim est bene recipere impressiones, ut manifestum est in aere et aqua, quamvis non bene retineant ; sed ad bonam retentionem requiritur magnum dominium siccitatis, siccum enim, licet cum difficultate recipiat, tamen cum recipit bene retinet et conservat, utque in lapidibus et lignis.
His preintellectis dico quod nos experimur in nobis quod cognoscimus diversitatem diversorum sensibilium ; et ad hoc specialiter deservit sensus communis, ut declaratum fuit, et ideo pertranseo.
Deinde nos etiam experimur in nobis quod in absentia sensibilium tam communium quam propriorum nos reservamus species eorum et tenemus, ut absente patre (ms., ed. pariete) tamen habes apud te speciem coloris eius et figure et huiusmodi ; similiter (ms. f. 124ra) autem in aliis. Et hoc est per virtutem ymaginativam, quam etiam quidam vocaverunt thesaurum seu archam formarum sensibilium. Et hoc bene oportuit fieri per aliam virtutem a sensu communi propter rationem pretactam, quia non est unius virtutis bene retinere et bene recipere.
Item nos experimur in nobis quod cognoscimus proprietates individuorum non sensatas, ut cognoscimus hanc paternitatem et hanc filiationem, hanc amicitiam et hanc inimicitiam et huiusmodi ; et ad hoc ponitur virtus cogitativa.
De hac autem virtute multa pulcra et utilia docet Commentator [Averroes] in diversis locis huius libri et ego nunc convertam ea propter bene esse, ut melius et clarius potero. Primo quidem de ista virtute dicit Commentator in secundo huius quod ista cognoscit intentiones, id est formas individuales, omnium decem predicamentorum, ut formam individualem huius hominis secundum quod est homo et hanc lineam et hanc albedinem et hanc paternitatem et hanc calefactionem et huiusmodi plura, ita quod non solum cognoscit accidentia sensibilia communia et propria, sed intentionem non sensatam et expoliat eam ab eis que fuerunt ei coniuncta de sensibilibus communibus et propriis. Spoliat dico, id est distincte et divisim cognoscit. Unde per tuam virtutem cogitativam tu cognoscis quod hec anima non est idem cum hoc corpore, et hoc manifestum est, et etiam quod hec amicitia non est idem cum hoc colore vel cum hac magnitudine vel motu vel huiusmodi ; et istam intentionem deponit cogitativa in virtute memorativa, ut dicit Commentator.
Item, de ista cogitativa dicit idem Commentator in tertio De anima quod quidam crediderunt eam esse intellectum et hoc specialiter attribuitur Galieno ; cuius ratio fuit quia ista virtus est propria homini et intellectus est proprius homini, ergo etc. Sed hoc non est verum, quia intellectus est virtus immaterialis et sine corpore subiecto et cognoscit quidditatem universaliter et abstracte ; sed cogitativa est de genere existentium in corpore, et hoc manifestum est de ea quia habet instrumentum determinatum, scilicet medium ventriculum cerebri ; et est virtus individualis et individualiter distincta ; nec valet ratio Galieni, quia procedit ex duabus affirmativis in secunda figura. Proptera dicit Commentator in eodem tertio quod ipsa est de genere virtutum sensibilium et subdit quod ymaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa non sunt nisi [ad presentandum ed., om. ms.] in loco virtutis sensibilis et ideo non indiget eis nisi in absentia sensibilis ; quod quomodo sit intelligendum videtur in tertio deo volente.
Rursus dicit Commentator de ista virtute in eodem tertio quod ista virtus est aliqua ratio et ipsum intelligo sic quod sicut ratio abstracta ratiocinatur de rebus universaliter apprehensis, sic ista nobilis virtus ratiocinatur de rebus individualiter apprehensis, et discurrit de uno in aliud ad cognitionem ignoti ; et ex hoc sequitur eam esse propriam homini, quia solus homo ratiocinat. Et dicit hic Commentator quod eius una actio nihil aliud est quam componere intentionem forme ymaginationis cum suo ydolo apud rememorationem, ut cum aliquis memoratur se vidisse album, virtus cogitativa componit quodammodo visionem, que est quedam intentio non sensata, cum albedine que est forma sensata, ita quod in isto actu, cum (46rb) aliquis iudicat se vidisse album, virtus ymaginativa presentat idolum albedinis et virtus memorativa presentat visionem preteritam et virtus cogitativa componit illa ad invicem. Et sic forte intellexit Commentator quod cogitativa componit intentionem forme cum ydolo apud rememorationem et addit et distinguit eam, scilicet intentionem, ab eo, scilicet ydolo, apud formationem, id est apud intelligere. Ad hoc enim quod intellectus distincte intelligat aliquam huiusmodi intentionem non sensatam, oportet quod virtus cogitativa distincte cogitet eam individualiter, ut patebit ex tertio huius.
Amplius de cogitativa inquit Commentator in eodem tertio quod cum ipsa fuerit adiuta per memorativam et ymaginativam, ipsa presentabit aliquando individuum aliquod, id est accipiet aliquam cognitionem individui quod non fuit sensatum ab illo homine cogitante, utpote cognitionem alicuius futuri aut alicuius preteriti ; verbi gratia sic intelligendo cum aliquis bonus medicus per suam virtutem cogitativam cognoscit hanc egritudinem huius hominis et eius causam et complexionem et etatem et locum et huiusmodi particularia, et per virtutem memorativam memoratur se vidisse seu cognoscivisse ex tali egritudine et consimili sequtam fuisse mortem et per virtutem ymaginativam ymaginatur mortem istius hominis, tunc contingit quod ipse iudicat vero iudicio hunc esse moriturum ac si presentialiter sentiret ipsum mori.
Similiter autem cum aliquis bonus methealogicus (sic ; ms. metrologicus) cogitat de grandine futura in estate et per virtutem suam memorativam memoratur se vidisse post talem calorem estivum et post talem nubem frequenter sequtam fuisse grandinem, et per ymaginativam ymaginatur descensum grandinis, tunc per cogitativam iudicat vero et recto iudicio grandinem esse cito futuram, ac si videret eam actu cadentem. Et posset poni exemplum in humanis agibilibus (?), sed quia illa sunt minus certa et sunt a libero arbitrio, ideo (om. ms) nolo exemplificare.
Hoc igitur est quod Commentator subiungit, et intentio cogitationis supple negotiantis circa preterita aut futura aut presentia que tamen remota sunt a sensu, nichil aliud est quam hoc, scilicet quod virtus cogitativa ponit rem absentem a sensu quasi rem sensatam. Unde subdit : et ideo comprehensibilia humana dividuntur in hec duo, scilicet in comprehensibile cuius principium est sensus et in comprehensibile cuius principium est cogitatio ; comprehensibile quidem cuius principium est sensus est illud quod est presens sensui, et comprehensibile cuius principium est cogitatio est illud quod est absens et precipue aut preteritum aut futurum.
Et adhuc dicit Commentator de hac virtute : et non debet aliquis dicere quod virtus cogitativa componit intellecta singularia, id est intellecta que scilicet seorsum et divisim fuerunt intellecta ; et iam declaratum est quod intellectus immaterialis componit ea, supple sub rationibus universalibus ; cogitatio autem non est respectu absentium, supple nisi distinguendo individua illorum intelligibilium et presentare ea in actu quasi essent apud sensum ; et ideo quando fuerunt in presentia apud sensum, tunc cadet cogitatio et remanebit actio intellectus in eis, id est respectu eorum. Et hoc ultimum dubium est bene dubium, quia secundum hoc videtur velle Commentator quod intellectus presente individuo rei intelligibilis ad sensum non indiget cogitativa ad intelligendum ; quod videtur multum inconveniens, quia Aristoteles dicit quod intelligentem quemcumque necesse est fantasma aliquod speculari ; fantasia autem, que immediate ministrat ipsi intellectui, videtur esse ipsa cogitativa ; et hoc videbitur in tertio huius.
Deinde dicit Commentator quod homo non est generabilis et corruptibilis nisi per istam virtu1tem, id est per formam quam consequitur ista virtus ; intellectus enim et secundum Aristotelem est perpetuus et ideo secundum ipsum homo non est corruptibilis.
Hec sunt que docet Commentator de virtute cogitativa et sunt ita bona, sicut tu vides. Et forte hec est illa virtus anime humane quam Aristoteles distinguit contra scientificum et vocat eam ratiocinativum vel (ms. f. 124va) consiliativum sexto Ethicorum.
Sequitur videre (46va) de virtute fantastica secundum Albertum. Dicit enim Albertus, et hoc est verum, quod nos experimur in nobis quod nos componimus ad invicem formas cum formis et intentiones cum intentionibus et intentiones cum formis et econverso. Et possimus exemplificare propter illos in quibus incipit oriri (ms. fieri) philosophia. Nos iudicamus hoc dulce esse (ms. fieri) album et hoc est componere formam cum forma ; per formam enim intelligit (ms. –ur) hic sensibile proprium aut commune. Similiter nos iudicamus hunc patrem esse amicum et hoc est componere intentionem cum intentione, nam per intentionem hic intelligitur (incun. intelligit) proprietatem non sensatam. Et rursus iudicamus hoc dulce esse delectabile vel conveniens et hoc est componere intentionem cum forma ; similiter et in aliis huiusmodi ; et hanc compositionem facit quarta virtus, scilicet fantastica, ut ipse dicit, et quedam alia congregat de ea ; sed hoc ad presens michi sufficit.
Deinde experimur in nobis quod in absentia sensibilium nos reservamus ipsas intentiones, id est proprietates non sensatas, et non est ab eadem potentia tenere bene et bene recipere, et ideo illa virtus retentiva debet esse alia a cogitativa, que cognoscit eas et bene recipit ; nec est eadem virtus reservativa que tenet formas sensatas et intentiones non sensatas, eo quod altioris gradus et abstractionis est intentio quam forma, ut dicit (sc. Albertus) ; et ideo cogimur ponere aliam virtutem que tenet intentiones elicitas, hoc est distincte cognitas ; et hec vocatur memorativa communi nominatione ; vocatur autem a quibusdam thesaurus intentionum, sicut ymaginativa dicitur thesaurus formarum. Est igitur hec doctrina illius viri et quamvis bene et realiter loquatur in maiori parte, tamen aliqualiter videtur recedere ab Averroi. Nam ipse non ponit virtutes illas interiores nisi quatuor, sicut apparet in tertio huius ; et hic allegat Aristotelem, dicens quod Aristoteles posuit virtutes distinctas individuales in quatuor ordinibus ; in primo posuit sensum communem, deinde ymaginationem, deinde cogitativam, et postea memorativam. Et addit Commentator et posuit rememorativam magis spiritualem, deinde cogitativam, deinde ymaginativam, et post sensum communem. Et puto quod illam virtutem quam Albertus vocat fantasiam, Commentator dicit eam esse cogitativam et hoc rationabile quia oportet quod virtus cogitativa comprehendens composita et simplicia sit eadem, ut ipsemet dicit in tertio huius capitulo. Indivisibilium quidem intelligibilia ; unde cum virtus cogitativa cognoscat intentiones et formas, necesse est ut ipsa eadem sit compositiva et divisiva earum ; unde non oportet quod aliqua alia virtus ea componat aut dividat precipue, quia natura non facit per plura quod potest per unum. Quia enim virtus cogitativa cognoscat formas sensatas, non debet esse dubium quia virtus cogitativa superior cognoscit illa que cognoscit inferior, modo tamen perfectiori. Ideo magis credo Commentatorem.
Organa autem istarum virtutum ponuntur communiter ab Alberto et Commentatore, quia sensus communis est in anteriori parte prime cellule cerebri in loco ubi concurrunt nervi sensitivi, scilicet sensuum particularium. Postea in parte posteriori illius prime cellule est virtus ymaginativa secundum Albertum ; in prima vero parte medie cellule que calida est ex motu multi spiritus ad ipsam, ponit virtutem cogitativam ; in medio autem ipsius medie cellule ponit fantasiam tamquam centrum inter ymaginativam et memorativam ; memoria enim est in posteriori parte cerebri, cuius signum est quia lesa illa parte leditur memoria ; et illud similiter est signum ad organa ceterorum. Commentator autem parum aliter loquitur, sed fere in idem redit, supponens enim quod sensus communis sit in anteriori parte prime cellule cerebri aut forte in corde secundum quod videtur velle Aristoteles in De sompno et vigilia. Aut utroque modo aut altero dicit quod virtus ymaginativa est in anteriori parte cerebri et hoc est intelligendum secundum Albertum quantum ad posteriorem partem prime cellule. Cogitativa autem est in medio et rememorativa in posteriori.
Dubitationes autem (46vb) que sunt circa istas virtutes debent tractari in parvis libris naturalibus, precipue in De sompno et vigilia et in De memoria et reminiscentia.
Et est advertendum quod Aristoteles in isto secundo non expresse loquitur nisi de duabus istarum virtutum, scilicet de fantasia et sensu communi. Et puto quod per fantasiam quandoque intelligit ymaginativam et quandoque cogitativam ; dicit enim quod fantasia reservat species sensibilium et hoc competit ymaginarie ; et dicit quod animalia multa operantur secundum illam, quod non est alio modo nisi quia animalia appetunt fugere aut prosequi illud quod fantasia iudicat aut bonum aut malum ; et hoc indubitanter convenit illi virtuti quam Commentator vocat cogitativam. Et in tertio De anima dicit Aristoteles quod fantasia quedam est rationalis, scilicet que ratiocinatur de rebus individualibus, quod etiam est cogitare. Unde per fantasiam quandoque intelligit cogitativam, ubi dicit : Et quoniam immanent, supple species sensibilium facte a sensibilibus secundum actum in virtute ymaginativa, multa secundum ipsam operantur animalia et agunt et patiuntur. De memoria vero et reminiscentia seorsum tractat in libello De memoria et reminiscentia et ibidem declaratum est quod reminiscentia non est aliud substantialiter a cogitativa.
Hiis visis (ms. premissis) dicendum ad questionem quod fantasia non est idem cum sensu particulari exteriori ; et de isto loquitur Aristoteles in littera, quod probat multipliciter. Sed accipio solum unam rationem ad hoc : si fantasia esset sensus exterior, aut esset sensus in potentia aut sensus in actu per sufficientem divisionem ; sed non potest esse sensus in potentia, quia maxime videretur esse visus. Nunc autem aliquis carens visu habet fantasiam, ut patet de ceco qui fantasiatur in sompnis ; et sic videtur quod fantasia non est idem cum visu et tamen maxime videtur (ms. videretur), quia fantasia sumpsit nomen a lumine quod (ms. et) pertinet ad visum, eo quod ipse visus est maxime sensus et plurium rerum cognitarum visu reservamus fantasmata quam ab aliis sensibus ; et ideo maxime videretur quod esset visus quasi quicumque alius sensus particularis.
Item, omne animal habet potentiam sensitivarum, ut notum est ; unde animal est animal per sensum ; sed quedam non habent fantasiam, ut formica et aves (corr. ex apes), sicut exemplificatur in littera. Sed ut dicit Albertus, illud exemplum omnino falsum est ; aves enim artificiose operantur casas et formica sibi providet in futurum, quod sine ymaginatione aut fantasia facere non possent. Unde Commentator videtur velle quod aves et formica habent ymaginativam, aves quidem per artificium, id est propter hoc quia operatur similiter arti, et formica propter depositum, id est quia deponit nutrimentum suum in loco determinato et tempore determinato. Et Albertus putat hoc provenisse non ex vitio Philosophi, sed ex vitio translatoris, quia translator non intellexit nomina animalium que dicit Aristoteles fantasiam non habere et loco eorum posuit formicas et aves. Vel si volumus salvare istam litteram et bonitatem translationis, possumus legere illud exemplum affirmative, ut sit sensus quod fantasia non videtur inesse animalibus sicut inest formice et avi ; et hoc est verum ; istis enim inest fantasia determinata, scilicet que potest esse in actu suo in absentia sensatorum.
De avibus autem dicit Commentator in secundo huius capitulo de odore quod aves moventur ad nutrimentum ex loco remotissimo, quia (ms. et) in quacumque regione fuerint in quodam tempore, singulis annis petunt litus maris, ut ex limo (ms. thimo) vigorem sui nutrimenti (ms. alimenti) percipiant. Formica similiter procedit (ms. vadit) de uno loco ad alium quasi ymaginans suum nutrimentum distans et redit ad locum determinatum ubi congregat in estate de quo vivat in hyeme. Unde in quadam scriptura[1] dicitur : « Surge miser usque quo dormis ; vade ad formicam et considera vias eius ; que cum (ms. quamvis) non habeat conductorem, congregat in estate de quo vivat in hyeme, etc. ». Patet igitur quod fantasia non est sensus in potentia. Et per idem convincitur quod non sit sensus in actu, quia iste inest omnibus animalibus ; fantasia autem non omnibus.
Sed considerandum quod secundum Commentatorem in isto secundo, et innuit Aristoteles tertio huius, fantasia est duplex (47ra); quedam est fantasia imperfecta et diminuta, et est illa que non est in actu suo nisi in presentia rei sensibilis ; et istam habent animalia quecumque imperfecta, nam aliter non cognoscerent intentionem convenientis et nocivi nec fugerent nocivum nec prosequerentur conveniens ; cuius oppositum videmus in imperfectissimis, scilicet quibus tactus solus inest, ut Aristoteles dicit in tertio huius. Ista enim cum punguntur aut eis apponitur aliquod disconveniens retrahunt se, quod non facerent nisi iudicarent illud sibi nocivum ; et cum apponitur eis aliquod conveniens, dilatant se super illud ut possunt, quod nequaquam agerent nisi cognoscerent illud sibi conveniens. Nocivum autem et conveniens seu proficuum sunt intentiones non sensate, quas non cognoscit aliquis sensus exterior. Unde relinquitur quod habent virtutem interiorem cognoscitivam istarum proprietatum, licet multum diminute cognoscant et solum cognoscant re presente. Cuius signum manifestum est, quia numquam moverent de se de uno loco ad alium locum distantem. Istis igitur concedebatur fantasia indeterminata, id est imperfecta et diminuta. Fantasia vero determinata est illa que fantasiatur aliquid in absentia ipsius ; et hanc habent animalia mobilia de loco ad locum.
Item, quod fantasia non sit sensus secundum actum est manifestum ex alio, quia dormientibus contingunt fantastice apparitiones ; in quibus tamen nullus est sensus particularis in actu sentiendi, ut probatur in De sompno et vigilia ; ergo fantasia nullo modo est sensus particularis.
Et est notandum quod fantasia aliquando sumitur pro potentia naturali anime sensitive, aliquando pro actu istius virtutis et pro potentia, aliquando sumitur pro virtute reservativa specierum sensibilium, et sic est ymaginativa, et quandoque sumitur pro potentia cognoscitiva ipsorum sensibilium in absentia eorum et cognoscitiva etiam non sensatorum, et sic est cogitativa secundum rei veritatem secundum Commentatorem tertio huius. Primo quidem modo videtur Aristoteles sumere fantasiam cum dicit quod in ipsa maneant species sensibilium similes sensibilibus. Et secundo modo cum ipse dicit quod fantasia quedam est rationalis, ut tangebatur prius, et etiam cum ipse dicit fantasiam esse principium motus una cum appetitu, ibi sumit fantasiam pro cogitativa ; illa enim virtus que cum appetitu est principium motus, debet cognoscere illud ad quod est motus tamquam bonum ad prosequendum. Unde Aristoteles in hoc probat intellectum speculativum non esse principium motus, quia nihil dicit de prosequibili aut fugibili [et ; ms. et ?] in illo capitulo. Videtur autem sensibile ex potentia existente ut (?) dicit. Cum autem delectabile aut tristabile affirmat aut negat, aut fugit aut sequitur ; non enim appetitus appetit prosequi nisi illud quod cognitum est sub ratione boni, neque fugere nisi quod cognitum est ut malum. Et hoc etiam manifestum est in De motibus animalium et ex tertio Ethicorum. Virtus autem fantastica quam Aristoteles ponit esse principium motus cum appetitu non est illa virtus que solum reservat ymagines aut species, sed est virtus cogitativa modo predicto ; et ille est cogitativa virtus in hominibus et estimativa in brutis. Et sic manifeste apparet quod Aristoteles accipit fantasiam pro cogitativa et estimativa.
Ad hoc cum ipse dicit quod intelligentem quemcumque necesse est fantasma aliquod speculari, puto quod per fantasiam intelligat actum cogitative. Et similiter in aliis verbis in quibus assignat virtutem ministrantem intellectui. Sed hoc magis manifestabitur in tertio.
(refutation of the contrary arguments)
Ad primam rationem dico quod concludit fantasiam esse aliquem sensum communiter dicto sensu pro interiori et exteriori ; sed non probat quod sit sensus particularis exterior.
Ad aliam cum dicitur « virtutes que habent idem obiectum etc. », dico quod verum est nisi sint virtutes ordinate ad invicem, sic quod una immutaretur ab alia. Sed si sunt ordinate isto modo, possunt habere quodammodo idem obiectum ; modo (47rb) fantasia et sensus sunt ordinate virtutes, quia fantasia non immutatur a rebus exterioribus nisi mediante sensu et ideo possunt habere idem obiectum ; visus autem et auditus sunt diverse virtutes quarum una non immutatur ab alia, et sic non habent unum obiectum sed diversa.
Ad aliam dico quod immo fantasia per actum predicte virtutis est motus factus a sensu actu simili illi, ut dicunt Aristoteles et Commentator ; et cum dicitur quod motus non remanet etc., potest dici quod sicut in motu continuo est considerare ipsam perfectionem que recipitur et ipsam receptionem quam Commentator vocat transmutationem coniunctam cum tempore in quinto Physicorum, sic in alteratione spirituali et instantanea est considerare qualitatem spiritualem que recipitur in virtute aliqua, et ipsam actualem transmutationem qua denominatur transmutata vel receptionem qua dicitur recipiens in actu.
Et siquidem sumatur motus spiritualis pro illa qualitate spirituali que recipitur in aliquo subiecto spiritualiter immutato, ille motus utique remanere potest absente vel deficiente motore qui illam formam impressit, ut deficiente vel absente igne calefaciente aquam potest remanere illa caliditas quam generavit ignis ; similiter autem in aliis multis. Sed si sumatur motus pro ipsa transmutatione actuali qua formaliter aliquid dicitur transmutatum (corr. ex –ti) et est de genere transmutationis secundum Commentatorem in quinto Physicorum et in tertio, sic verum est quod motus non remanet absente motore ; absente enim igne calefaciente amplius aqua non transmutatur ad caliditatem.
Et est intelligenda diffinitio quam ponit Aristoteles quod fantasia est motus factus a sensu secundum actum, idest quedam forma vel qualitas spiritualiter impressa alicui virtuti ab ipso sensu actuato specie sensibili et illa multum bene remanet in virtute reservativa. Unde sine dubio Aristoteles videtur ibi capere fantasiam pro actu virtutis ymaginative quem recipit a sensu actuato et ideo non valet ratio. Dixerunt autem aliqui quod diffinitio sic intelligi debet « fantasia est motus etc. », id est virtus nata moveri a sensu secundum actum, ita quod ibi Aristoteles accipit accidens pro subiecto ad ipsum notificandum ; ideo non valet ratio.
Expliciunt questiones supra secundum librum De anima Magistri Johannis de Janduno.
Summary and partial translation:
Like all other questions, this one begins with the formulation of the problem: is the fantasia the same virtue as (common) sense? Three arguments are given for the affirmative answer, the authority of Aristotle for the negative one.
Here too, the solution starts with preliminary remarks “ad evidentiam questionis”. The first concerns the distinction of the various faculties of the sensitive soul as explained by Albertus Magnus. The inner senses are said to be five. John adds two clarifications: first, that in humans there are not only sensible accidents, but also certain properties not experienced by the senses, like goodness or aggressiveness, or fatherhood or filiation, etc. They are said not perceptible intentions, and explained by Averroes in his treatise De memoria et reminiscentia.
The second remark is that it is not the function of the same virtue to well perceive and well retain the images (species). The reason, says John, is explained by Albertus, who takes it from Averroes: to well perceive, humidity must be dominant of in the organ, whereas to well retain, dryness must be dominant.
Now, John gives his solution: we experience in ourself the diversity of the various sensible things thanks to the common sense, as explained above (in question 36). Next, we also experience in ourself that in the absence of sensible things there are images (species) and that is thanks to the imaginative virtue. Also, we experience in ourself that we know the properties of individuals, and for this we assume the cogitative virtue.
After this short presentation of the functions of the imaginative and cogitative virtues, John proceeds with a discussion of the last one:
And about this virtue the Commentator teaches many beautiful and useful things in various places of this book [the commentary on De anima] and I will convert them for reasons of wellbeing (bene esse), as well and as clearly as I can.
First, Averroes says in the second book of De anima that this virtue knows the intentions, that is the individual forms of all the ten predicaments, like the individual form of this man as a man and of this form etc., so that it knows not only the sensible accidents but also the not perceived intention, which he takes from them, that is he knows them distinctly and separately. “Thus, thanks to your cogitative virtue you know that this soul is not the same thing as this body, and that is manifest, and also that this friendship is not the same thing as this colour or this magnitude or movement and such on; and it deposes that intention in the memorative virtue, as the Commentator says”.
Then again, about this virtue Averroes says in the third book that some have taken it for the intellect, and in particular Galen; but this is not true, because the intellect is an immaterial virtue, without a corporeal subject, and it knows the quiddity in a universal and abstract way, but the cogitative virtue is of the kind that exists in the body, and it is an individual virtue; and the argumentation of Galen is faulty. And therefore Averroes says that it belongs to the sensible virtues and he adds that the imaginative and cogitative and memorative virtues are in place of the sensitive virtue and therefore this needs them only in the absence of the sensible things; and how this happens will be seen in the third book, deo volente.
Again, Averroes says about the same virtue in the same third book that “it is some kind of reason (aliqua ratio) and I understand this in this way that, as abstract reason reasons about universally apprehended things, so that noble virtue reasons about individually apprehended things, and it goes from one to the other to gain knowledge of the unknown; and from this it follows that it is proper to man, because only man reasons”. And Averroes says here that its action is nothing else than to compose the intention of the image of the imagination with its idol in the reminiscence, as when someone memorises having seen white, the cogitative virtue composes in some way the vision, which is some intention not perceived, with the whiteness which is a perceived image, so that in that action someone judges that he has seen white. “And thus perhaps the Commentator has understood that the cogitative virtue composes the intention of the form with the idol in the reminiscence and adds and distinguishes it, i.e. the intention, from that, i.e. the idol, near the formation, i.e. the intellection (apud intelligere). Because, for the intellect, in order to grasp distinctly some not perceived intention of this kind, it is necessary that the cogitative virtue distinctly thinks (cogitet) it individually, as will be clear form the third book”.
Moreover Averroes says in the third book that sometimes this virtue will present some individual, i.e. will receive some knowledge of an individual thing that has not been perceived by a thinking man, like the knowledge of something in the future or in the past; for instance, when some good physician by his cogitative virtue knows this illness of this man, and the cause and the complexion and age and place and that kind of particulars, and by the memorative virtue remembers that he has seen or known that from such illness death has followed and by the imaginative virtue imagines the death of this man, then it happens that he judges with correct judgement that this man is going to die as if he perceived him die in the present.
In the same way, when some good meteorologist thinks about the grail that will fall in summer and by his memorative virtue remembers he has seen that after such summer heat and after such clouds there has frequently been grail, and by his imaginative virtue imagines the grail falling, then by the cogitative virtue he judges correctly that grail will soon come, as if he saw it actually falling. “And one could give an example about human actions, but those are less certain and depend on free will, therefore I will not give an example”.
So this is what the Commentator adds, and the intention of cogitation, add negotiating with past or future or present things, which are remote from sensation, is nothing else but this, i.e. that the cogitative virtue considers a thing absent from perception as a perceived thing. And thus he adds: and therefore comprehensible human things are divided into two, i.e. in comprehensible originating from sense and comprehensible originating from cogitation.
And again the Commentator says about this virtue: and one must not say that the cogitative virtue composes singular ‘intellected’ (intellecta) things, i.e. which were ‘intellected’ outside and apart; it has already been made clear that the immaterial intellect composes those, but cogitation is not about absent things, unless it distinguishes individuals of these intelligibles and presents them actually as if perceived; and therefore when they were present with the sense, then cogitation falls away and the action of the intellect remains in them, i.e. in respect of them. “And this last doubt is really a doubt, for according to this the Commentator seems to mean that the intellect, when the individual of the intelligible thing is present to the sense, does not need the cogitative virtue to conceive it (ad intelligendum); and this is very inconvenient, because Aristotle says that whoever thinks (intelligentem) must imagine some fantasma; and the fantasia, which directly serves the intellect, seems to be the cogitative itself; and this will be seen in the third book”.
Then the Commentator says that man is generable and corruptible only by that virtue, i.e. by the form effected by this virtue; for the intellect, also according to Aristotle, is perpetual and therefore according to him man is not corruptible.
These are the things which the Commentator teaches about the cogitative virtue and they are good as such, as you see. And perhaps this is that virtue of the human soul that Aristotle distinguishes against the scientist (scientificum) and he calls it reasoning (ratiocinativum) or conciliatory (consiliativum) in the sixth book of the Ethics.
So, in the preceding pages John has lengthily discussed the cogitative virtue. From here on he treats the virtus fantastica, and he does so explicitly following Albertus Magnus:
Next, we have to see about the ‘fantastic’ virtue according to Albertus. For Albertus says, and this is true, that we experience in our self that we compose mutually forms with forms and intentions with intentions and intentions with forms and vice versa. And we can exemplify because of those in whom philosophy comes into being.
John describes Albert’s theory and proceeds to criticise it:
So, this is the doctrine of that man and although he speaks well and truly for the major part, still in some way he seems to recede from Averroes.
For Averroes supposes only four interior virtues, following Aristotle as he says, and these are common sense, imaginative virtue, cogitative virtue and memorative virtue. And Albert adds to this and supposes reminiscence, then imagination, then cogitative virtue and finally memory. John thinks that (puto quod) the virtue called fantasia by Albertus is the cogitative virtue of Averroes, and he considers this reasonable, explaining why. Therefore, he says, he believes the Commentator more.
In the next paragraph, John discusses the organs of the interior virtues, situated in the various parts of the brain, according to Albertus and the Commentator, the last differing only slightly from the first. Note that the corresponding passage in Radulphus Brito is much more detailed[2].
The doubts about these virtues must be discussed, says John, in the books on the Parva naturalia, especially in the De sompno et vigilia and the De memoria et reminiscentia. And we must be aware of the fact that Aristotle in this second book on the soul expressly mentions only two virtues, i.e. fantasia and common sense. “And I think that by fantasia he sometimes means the imaginative virtue and sometimes the cogitative, for he says that […]”. So, by fantasia he sometimes means the cogitative virtue. And he treats memory and reminiscence in a separate booklet De memoria et reminiscentia and there it is clarified that reminiscence is substantially not different from the cogitative virtue.
Finally, John comes to his determination of the question (“His visis dicendum ad questionem”): fantasia is not the same as a particular exterior sense. Aristotle proves this in multiple ways, but I accept only one way […].
Also, every animal has sensitive faculties, but some do not have the fantasia, like ants and birds, as is exemplified in (Aristotle’s) text. But, as Albert says, this example is completely erroneous, for birds build homes artfully and ants provide for the future, which they could not do without imaginative power or fantasia. Thus, Averroes seems to mean that birds and ants have an imaginative faculty […]. And Albertus thinks this did not come from an error of the Philosopher, but from an error of the translator, because the translator did not understand the names of the animals of which Aristotle says they have no fantasia, and instead of them he put ants and birds. Or, if we want to save that text and the correctness of the translation, we can read that example in the affirmative way, so that the meaning is that fantasia does not seem to exist in animals as it exists in the ant and the bird; and this is true, for they have a determined fantasia, i.e. which can be in action in absence of the perceived things.
Here John points to a passage of Averroes, in the second book of De anima, on odour, in which the Commentator mentions the faculty of birds to find again the place from which they went to far off regions and of ants who go from one place to another as if imagining their distant food. So, according to Averroes some animals have fantasia but not all.
John then continues saying that according to Averroes in this second book and Aristotle in the third book, fantasia is double, for there is imperfect and diminished fantasy which is in action only in the presence of the sensible thing, and this all imperfect animals have, for else they would not know what is convenient or harmful; and we see the opposite in the most imperfect one, who only have touch, as Aristotle teaches in the third book. For if they find something inconvenient, they retract, and if it is convenient, they expand themselves on it. And harmful and convenient or profitable are not perceived intentions, unknow by any exterior sense. Thus it results that they have an interior virtue knowing these proprieties, although in a very diminutive way and only in presence of the thing itself. This is evident, for they would never by themselves go from one place to a distant other place. Thus, to those was conceded an indeterminate fantasy, i.e. imperfect and diminished. But determined fantasy is that which imagines something in its absence; and this is what animals going from one place to another have. Also, that fantasy is not a sense in action is clear from something else, because those who sleep have imaginative apparitions, and there is no particular sense in action during sleep, as is proved in the De somno et vigilia, thus fantasia is in no way a particular sense.
Here John adds a passage about the different ways in which fantasia is taken: a natural power of the sensitive soul, the action of that power, the virtue which stores the sensible species, and so it is the imaginative virtue, and sometimes the power knowing those sensible things in their absence and knowing also not perceived things, and so it is veritably the cogitative power according the Averroes in this third book. For the other interpretations John quotes various texts of Aristotle. In the end, he concludes: “And so it appears manifestly that Aristotle takes fantasia for the cogitative and estimative virtue”.
He adds a last note on Aristotle’s interpretation: “when he (i.e. Aristotle) says that anybody understanding something must consider some fantasma, I think that by fantasia he understands the act of the cogitative virtue. And likewise in other sayings in which he assigns a virtue providing the intellect. But this will be made more manifest in the third book”.
Finally, we come to the habitual last section of the question, the refutation of the arguments given in the beginning for the opposite answer. The third one, about Aristotle’s definition of fantasia as movement, is discussed somewhat longer than the others and ends, of course, with a justification of Aristotle: “Thus, without doubt, Aristotle seems to take fantasia here as the action of the imaginative virtue, which it receives from the activated sense; and therefore the argument is invalid. And some have said that the definition ‘fantasia est motus etc.’ must be understood as follows: a virtue able to be moved into action by the sense, so that Aristotle takes the accident for the subject to notify it; therefore the argument is invalid”.
Several points should be noted. First, the subject manifestly interested John, particularly the relation between fantasia and cogitativa, and it is with the latter, the virtue which enables us to know the properties of individuals, that he starts out on a long discussion of these fascinating abilities. His main sources are, as predictable, Aristotle, Averroes and Albertus Magnus, but he also mentions Galen, whom he criticises, as elsewhere. In the part on fantasia John announces from the start that here he follows Albertus. In fact, the whole section seems to be a kind of dialogue between Albertus and Averroes, arbitrated by John, who finally prefers Averroes’s view. Also, he is clearly interested in the faculties attributed to animals.
Secondly, as in the other questions, we may note the personal and often colloquial style: “et ego nunc convertam”, “et ipsum intelligo sic quod “, “et hoc ultimum dubium est bene dubium”, “et sunt ita bona, sicut tu vides”, “ideo magis credo Commentatorem”, “videtur ibi capere fantasiam” (“prendre pour”).
[1] Proverbia 6, 6.
[2] See this website Section VI C.
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